A One Percent Chance: Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall Doctrine by Harman, Andrew
Chapman University 
Chapman University Digital Commons 
War and Society (MA) Theses Dissertations and Theses 
5-2016 
A One Percent Chance: Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall 
Doctrine 
Andrew Harman 
Chapman University, a22harman@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses 
 Part of the Cultural History Commons, History of Religion Commons, International Relations 
Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, Military History Commons, Near and Middle 
Eastern Studies Commons, Other History Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Political History 
Commons, Public History Commons, and the Social History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harman, Andrew. A One Percent Chance: Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall Doctrine. 2016. 
Chapman University, MA Thesis. Chapman University Digital Commons, https://doi.org/10.36837/
chapman.000018 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Chapman University 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War and Society (MA) Theses by an authorized 
administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
laughtin@chapman.edu. 
A One Percent Chance:  Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall Doctrine 
A Thesis by  
Andrew Gregory Harman 
Chapman University 
Orange, CA 
Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in War and Society 
May 2016 
Committee in charge: 
Leland Estes, Ph.D., Chair 
Gregory Daddis, Ph.D.
Nubar Hovsepian, Ph.D. 

iii 
A One Percent Chance:  Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall Doctrine 
Copyright © 2016 
by Andrew Gregory Harman 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The extensive research and hard work put toward this Master’s thesis owes tribute 
to a great many people that have assisted in its execution along the way.  I must first 
acknowledge the faculty and staff at Chapman University and the Leatherby Libraries for 
their help and available resources.  I would also like to thank Dr. Jennifer Keene for her 
vision in creating the War and Society program from its infancy and helping me pave the 
way for future classes.  This program has then been structured and given life by its 
director, Dr. Gregory Daddis, without whom my extended education would not be 
possible, along with all other professors within the Chapman University History 
Department and other departments within the Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, 
and Social Sciences.  I would then like to acknowledge Dr. Leland Estes for his 
tremendous work as my thesis advisor and the many edits and suggestions that made this 
thesis a scholarly paper worthy of this institution and the discipline of history.  
Contextual and theoretical structures for this work are largely owed to Dr. Nubar 
Hovsepian who, as an expert in Middle East conflict and the Israel/Palestine question, has 
been invaluable to my understanding of the complex processes that have taken place 
within the region.  Lastly, a great many thanks is owed to Dr. Liam O’Mara IV as my 
direct field advisor with whom I have spent many hours of consultation on this and other 
related projects.  Without him my introduction to this subject, its nuances and historical 
processes, and the passion for these historical narratives would not have happened.  
Thank you all for your tireless work and for providing me with the tools to complete this 
very important study of historical research.  
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
A One Percent Chance:  Jabotinsky, Bernadotte, and the Iron Wall Doctrine 
by Andrew Gregory Harman 
 This thesis is an examination of the long historical processes that have led to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict to the contemporary period, focusing mostly on the period before 
Israeli independence and the 1948 war that created the Jewish state.  As Zionism emerged 
at the turn of the twentieth century to combat the antisemitism of Europe, practical and 
political facets of the movement sought immigration to Palestine, an area occupied by a 
large population of Arab natives.  The answer to how the Zionists would achieve a Jewish 
state in that region, largely ignoring the indigenous population, fostered disagreements 
and a split in the Zionist ideology.  The Revisionist Zionist organization was founded by 
Ze’ev Jabotinsky and favored a more militant orientation.   With an “Iron Wall” 
manifesto, and as time passed and international aid waned, the Revisionists evolved into 
an anticolonial movement that not only viewed Palestinians as an obstacle to the Jewish 
state but turned their anticolonial furor toward the British and United Nations threats.  
That evolution reached a crescendo in 1948 when the Revisionist paramilitary group Lehi 
assassinated the UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte.  That act was a catalyst that began the 
end of the war and the solidification of a Palestinian refugee crisis that persists to the 
present.  As the Iron Wall Doctrine evolved from the early teachings of Jabotinsky 
through anticolonial violence and the removal of native Arabs from the new state of 
Israel, future prime ministers who were former Revisionist terrorists maintained the 
prescribed perpetual state of war Jabotinsky predicted with the now landless Palestinians.  
This research concludes that both Jabotinsky and Bernadotte were crucial characters in 
the narrative that allowed for the Iron Wall Doctrine, and thus the Jewish state, to not 
vi 
 
only exist but to carry on beyond the 1948 independence into the long standing conflict it 
has become.   
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Off the more commonly trodden paths taken at Israel’s national cemetery, atop Mount 
Herzl in Jerusalem, lies a gravesite that stands mostly alone.  With only a name, inscribed in 
Hebrew, this particular granite slab lacks the quotes or dates, let alone fanfare, of some of the 
more visited sites overlooking the holy city.  Throughout the rest of Israel, it is impossible to find 
even that small of a display memorializing another man, though their fates were so much 
intertwined.  When one thinks of the most influential people to Zionism or to the state of Israel, 
there is a pantheon of names that come to mind.  David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak 
Shamir, and current four-term Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have all left their marks on 
the Jewish state.  While each will be discussed at length here, it is because they are inextricably 
linked to the two men alluded to above, Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Count Folke Bernadotte.  From the 
turn of the century to the creation of the new state in 1948, they were two sides of a coin that has 
to this point determined the fate of Israel and its relationship to the Palestinian people.   
Wars are not fought in a vacuum and states are not created overnight.  The war for Israeli 
independence in 1948 was no exception.  Zionist Jews took power over historic Palestine and 
established a Jewish state that has persisted under Zionist rule to this day.  But as Michel 
Foucault suggested, “I don’t believe that the question of ‘who exercises power?’ can be resolved 
unless that other question ‘how does it happen?’ is resolved at the same time.”1  Decades old 
political developments helped to define the war and the creation of the new state, while a unique 
set of circumstances and an evolving ideology defined how the war ended and the perpetual war 
through which Israel has conducted itself in the decades that followed.   
                                                          
1 Michel Foucalt, “On Power,” (original interview with Pierre Boncenne, 1978), in Michel 
Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Lawrence D. 
Kritzman, (New York: Routledge, 1988), 103. 
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Early Zionists, the progenitors of modern Israelis, joined in Jewish immigration to 
Palestine and sought a political means to establish a Jewish homeland there.  Events occurring 
both globally and within Palestine caused some revisionists of political Zionism to believe in a 
more militaristic orientation underpinning their ideology.2  This Revisionist movement, founded 
by Ze’ev Jabotinsky at the turn of the twentieth century, continued to redefine itself in the 
succeeding decades.  Maximalist factions especially have been concerned, to varying degrees at 
different periods of time, with settling all of Eretz Yisrael, or the greater territory of biblical 
Israel.  These factions, which manifested militarily as Lehi and the Irgun, developed a radical 
mentality directed toward meddlesome international bodies and sparked events largely 
responsible for establishing the future Jewish state as it has come to be known.   
These splinter groups, with an anticolonial orientation, provided Revisionists the 
mechanism with which they could expel intrusion.  As the United Nations intervened in 1948 to 
attempt to implement a long term peace proposal between Zionist groups and their Arab 
adversaries, their Mediator’s actions were seen only as a manifestation of imperialism.3  The 
Mediator, Count Folk Bernadotte of Sweden, despite his benevolence, did not understand the 
facts on the ground as they existed.  In official diplomatic documents, language can be revealing.  
In UN documents the word Zionism is seldom found and never in reference to any understanding 
of ideological and cultural differences between the divergent Zionist groups.  The term “Jew” 
                                                          
2 It is important to note here that though there were several distinctive factions of Zionism, the 
word “Zionist” refers to the political Zionists that built the Jewish population under the British 
Mandate and later Provisional governments in Palestine and Israel respectively.  “Revisionist” 
will refer to the Revisionist organization, regardless of disagreements and splits within as the 
Revisionist Zionist movement was maintained with one leader, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, from its 
founding until his death in 1940, after which point off-shoots of Revisionism are mentioned by 
name.   
3 Throughout this paper the term “Mediator” will be capitalized as an official title as recognized 
by the United Nations Security Council in official documents. 
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was used to refer to all Jewish people in the region, missing the complexities of their cultures and 
ideologies, which precluded any comprehension of the splinter Revisionist factions.  British 
historian E.P. Thompson has noted that “the very term ‘culture,’ with its cozy invocation of 
consensus, may serve to distract attention from social and cultural contradictions.”4  Placing a 
very complex group of people under an umbrella moniker proved to be a history altering 
mistake.  A final act of defiance by the radical Revisionists shed light on these complexities and 
hastened the end of the war, and with it the domination of Israel’s future by a Revisionist Zionist 
orientation.  The Revisionists had completed their evolution and exerted their power over a 
movement of liberation from foreign rule.  The state of Israel was engineered on the foundation 
of a radical Revisionist Zionism after its evolution into anticolonial terrorist groups.5  Since then, 
the adoption of this radical doctrine of perpetual war against the native population has fueled the 
Israeli state and its control over territory and people.  Helmed by some of the very people 
responsible for the Revisionist shift in Zionist ideology and its crystallizing act, the premiers of 
Israel have maintained a policy that reaches back to the ideals set out by Jabotinsky and which 
led to the assassination of Bernadotte.  Contradictions in language and the consistent use of 
illegal factions have ensured that Israel continued to remain in power over the years and the 
Palestinian people remain stateless.  As Ilan Pappé so aptly put it, “the current Israeli attitude 
towards and perception of the Palestinian refugee problem has to be analyzed against their 
conduct in the 1948 Palestine War.”6   Thus, the death of Bernadotte has become a pivotal point 
in the history of Israel, as a catalyst caught between Jabotinsky’s Revisionism and a future 
                                                          
4 E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture, (New York: 
New Press, 1993), 56. 
5 The Irgun Zvai Leumi (the Irgun) and Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or the British 
Moniker ‘the Stern Gang’) are the later radical military factions of the Revisionist movement. 
6 Ilan Pappé, “Israeli Perceptions of the Refugee Question,” in Palestinian Refugees: The Right 
of Return, ed. by Naseer Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 71. 
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doctrine of Revisionist rule.  
This is not a study of who is right or wrong, per se, or an examination of Israeli or 
Palestinian claims to land or any other entitlement.  This is rather an analysis of how Zionism, an 
agreeably positive concept at its original core, became radical, violent, and contradictorily 
subjugating of a people innocent to the thousands of years long Jewish plight.  The voice of the 
Palestinian people, or other combatant Arab nations, will be missing from this study to pay due 
focus to the ideology and developing policies of the Zionist and Revisionist Zionist 
organizations. 7  From an idea to a political movement, from a treatise of self-determination to a 
virulent call to action, Zionism evolved into a political doctrine that at first played a part in 
creating a problem, and then continued to perpetuate the cycle from a position of power, with a 
history of violence in the balance.  How that power came to be and how that doctrine came to 
rule, through an examination of not only the structures, but of the agents that shaped the 
historical structures now commonplace, is important to understanding modern realities.  This 
study argues that the figurative Iron Wall presented by the Revisionist founder evolved into a 
political doctrine that, largely because of the catalyzing assassination of the UN Mediator during 
the 1948 war, has persisted in suppressing the Palestinian people. 
                                                          
7 Note: It should be noticed that the Arab voice will largely be excluded from this study.  That 
exclusion is intentional to maintain a focus on the evolution of Zionism, largely independent of 
the feelings of the Arab population, and on Bernadotte as the voice for the Palestinian refugees 
from this conflict.  Though Palestinian actions, i.e. uprisings and political adversity, were a 
hindrance to the Zionist movement for decades, especially Revisionist overtures, the Arab 
individuals’ sentiments were of no consequence to the movement.  The Revisionist doctrine that 
began with Jabotinsky and evolved through the 1948 war and beyond, acknowledged Arab 
resistance and sought a Jewish state both in place of, and in spite of, Arab wishes.   
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 Historian Eran Kaplan pointed out that the history of Israel was mostly written by the 
“victors;” namely the mainstream Zionists and more specifically the Labor Party (Mapai).8  This 
has precluded a discussion of what the Palestinian people believed occurred over the early 
twentieth century, though the Revisionist influence abounds.  Other recent historians have 
focused more intently on this Revisionist influence and the disagreements between them and the 
mainstream, as well as the more radical splinter groups.  One such work is The Stern Gang: 
Ideology, Politics and Terror 1940-1949, written by Israeli historian Joseph Heller.9  Heller 
studies the shift in Revisionist thinking that led away from early pro-British, and thus colonial, 
sentiments and towards a more radical vision for Palestine’s future.  He argues that “an 
understanding of [Lehi] requires an analysis of the political and ideological character of 
Revisionism, and in particular its internal struggles with regard to fascism and democracy.”10  He 
covers the evolution of radical Zionism through the infancy of Revisionism to the so often shared 
narrative of its manifestation during the independence war.  He, however, places less emphasis 
on specific actions of the Stern Gang, such as the murder of the UN Mediator that made a 
difference in the tide of history, and stops short of trying to explain how this ideology manifested 
in future Israeli politics.  He focuses his attention on the political background of the Revisionist 
movement in the 1930s.  Heller’s emphasis on the arguments within the Revisionist Zionist 
organization over a decade before the war for independence missed the fact that Lehi’s 
assassination of Count Bernadotte is the culminating act in their transformation.  Though he 
discusses the violence of Lehi and the ideology behind it, Heller gives less attention to the fact 
                                                          
8 Eran Kaplan, The Jewish Radical Right: Revisionist Zionism and its Ideological Legacy, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), i-xix. 
9 See Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror 1940-1949, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995). 
10 Ibid., 1. 
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that their violence was a symptom of the systemic transformation toward anticolonial sentiments 
they had undergone amidst the tumultuous events surrounding the Zionist fight for Israel.   
Only a few scholars have dealt with Bernadotte and his involvement in the 1948 war.  In 
fact, Kati Marton and Amitzur Ilan are the only historians who have covered Bernadotte in any 
comprehensive way and address the involvement of the radical Zionists in his assassination.  
Marton argued that “Bernadotte’s assassination is also the story of the near destruction of a 
fragile new state…from a fratricidal conflict within her own borders.”11  However, their work 
highlights the event of his death and the players involved while ignoring some of the lingering 
structures of radical Zionism’s evolution to that point, while once again stopping short of delving 
into the longer historical consequences.12  The so-called “new historians,” Ilan Pappé, Benny 
Morris, and Avi Shlaim, offer histories of the overall Arab/Zionist conflict, the independence 
war, and the Iron Wall Doctrine, respectively.  The “new historians” are so called because, as 
Israeli historians, they have provided a new narrative to the Palestine conflict that largely differs 
from that written by the Zionist elite.  They have covered a great deal of a revisionist historical 
narrative that views the historical events that led to the creation of Israel from another angle.  
Pappé provides contextual background over the course of this history, presenting “some of the 
most recent developments in the conflict’s and the country’s historiography.”13  Morris describes 
the 1948 war in great detail, shedding light on the conduct of conflicting parties, giving chapters 
that sometimes cover only a two week period, or smaller.  Shlaim, however, takes the overall 
ideology of the Revisionists a step beyond the exploits of 1948 in his book The Iron Wall.  His 
                                                          
11 Kati Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), xi. 
12 See Marton, A Death in Jerusalem; Amitzur Ilan, Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948: A Study in 
Contemporary Humanitarian Knight-Errantry, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 
13 Ilan Pappé, “Introduction: New historiographical orientation in the research on the Palestine 
Question,” in The Israel/Palestine Question: A Reader, 2nd ed., edited by Ilan Pappé (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 1. 
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research focused on “the first fifty years of Israeli foreign policy,” and goes to show how the 
doctrine has continued to carry weight in Israeli policy in the half-century that the state has been 
in existence.14  Once again, however, tying all of this together is important for not only 
understanding who is in power, as Foucault enlightened, but how that power came to be.  Some 
historians have changed the narrative of Israeli history while others have focused on Bernadotte, 
and still some have focused on the evolution of radical Zionism.  This paper intends to bring 
together this historiography in an analysis that shows the importance of each area of research on 
the others.  The creation of Israel cannot be understood without analyzing the circumstances 
surrounding Bernadotte’s death, while that event must be placed in its larger context of 
Revisionist ideological evolution.  
 These scholarly works help to contextualize and make sense of the primary documents 
used in the study that connects these larger epochs in Zionist history.  The writings of men like 
Theodor Herzl and Ze’ev Jabotinsky provide the insights into Zionist and later Revisionist 
ideologies, as well as the memoirs of those involved; namely Ben-Gurion, and Shamir.  
Memoirs, though often lacking in historical accuracy when it comes to details, can be very 
revealing.  The premiers in particular held tightly to their beliefs for decades after direct 
involvement, as will be shown.  For example, Shamir wrote his before becoming prime minister 
and while still willing to admit to strong feelings on the endeavors of his Lehi comrades during 
the war for Palestine.  Historical accuracy is, however, just as important.  
Primary sources from the time help in creating a factual record of what occurred, 
especially during such tumultuous times, though some require delicate examination.  Though 
news print can be biased, Palestinian news articles tell the story as it was seen on the ground, 
                                                          
14 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2000), xi. 
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while American newspapers covered the international reaction, and had the benefit of being 
available to the United Nations decision makers in New York.  The documents created by the 
UN also help to create a lasting narrative of events on the ground of the world body’s reaction in 
real time.  These myriad sources provide the facts to fit within the mosaic narrative that covers 
the first half of the twentieth century.  The best sources for Bernadotte’s involvement in Israel 
are the books he wrote at the time.  He kept a detailed account of his dealings with various 
diplomats of both Zionist and Arab persuasion, as well as the international community at large, 
almost right up until his death.  This provides the narrative of how the first Israel/Palestine peace 
process was handled, and the immense trouble with which that legacy was created.  
Unfortunately, Bernadotte’s narrative is devoid of any mention of Revisionist Zionism and 
obviously the events surrounding his own death.  Events like this seemingly secondary moment 
in history “could be the indication of a long reality, and sometimes, marvelously, of a 
structure.”15  That systemic structure of evolution toward radicalism amidst the circumstances of 
Revisionism is studied here as it progressed toward a meeting with the UN Mediator that 
changed history and the future of Israel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Fernand Braudel cited in “Le Dimanche de Bouvines, 27 Juilet, 1214,” by Georges Duby, 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1973; p. 9), translated by Rashid Khalidi in Brokers of Deceit: How the US 
has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013), xi. 
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CHAPTER 2:  EARLY ZIONISM and REVISIONISM 
 The ideological legacy of Revisionist Zionist thought is the Iron Wall Doctrine, the belief 
that a Jewish majority and a state could be achieved and maintained in Palestine through the will 
of the Zionists and the repression of the indigenous population.  To understand the Iron Wall 
Doctrine, it is important to discuss the origins of Zionism itself and how it was revised into an 
offshoot organization with differing goals.  Political Zionism emerged to answer the “Jewish 
Question” amidst the antisemitism of nineteenth century Europe.  It built upon the idea that the 
Jews were a nation without a home.  Early Zionist thinkers like Leo Pinsker, Theodor Herzl, and 
Chaim Weizmann focused Zionist ideology on finding a physical homeland for the Jews.  The 
movement was secular in orientation, as opposed to the religious Zionist concepts of a return to 
Zion that could only be determined by God.  While secular Zionists agreed on Palestine as a 
natural choice during their earliest conferences, political Zionism was founded to be a movement 
that sought national autonomy through the means of political bargaining with established states, 
regardless of where that homeland would be.16  Finding a homeland, however, would be an act of 
practicality that literally moved European Jews to another physical space.  Practical Zionism 
began well before any bargaining for legitimacy.17  This consisted of those Zionists who 
physically moved out of Europe and was well underway by the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, decades before the First World Zionist Congress of 1897 that determined Palestine 
                                                          
16 Louis Lipsky, “Introduction,” in The Jewish State by Theodor Herzl (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1988), 9-20; after some deliberation, including immigration to Uganda as a place 
for the Jewish state, Palestine became a “natural” choice due to the historical and biblical ties to 
the land for the Jewish people.   
17 Practical Zionism was the physical emigration out of Europe that sought to end the Jewish 
diaspora, which began in the middle of the nineteenth century. Political Zionism was the 
endeavor to earn international legitimacy for a Jewish state among the rest of the states of the 
world.  These were largely secular Zionist motivations, while some religious Zionists sought a 
return to Palestine for the ties to the biblical land of Israel for religious reasons.  
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would be the seat of the Jewish homeland.18  European Jews had been emigrating to Palestine, 
and elsewhere, for some time and these migrations, or aliyot (singular; aliyah) had resulted in a 
small population of Jews in Palestine by the turn of the century.19  These Zionists were interested 
in the settlement of the land as an agrarian reconnection with the roots of their ancestors.   
With Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann came the World Zionist Organization (WZO) 
which sought to answer the question of how Zionism should proceed.  Herzl favored diplomacy 
which would continue to be the popular method of Zionist actions toward attaining a Jewish state 
for years to come.20  In 1906, a conference met and established the Helsingfores Programme.  
This was a delegation of Zionists from Russia that gathered in Helsinki, Finland; they were from 
what Jabotinsky called “the center of world Zionism.”21  At this conference, the foundations 
were laid for a practical Zionism that worked in hand with the political and diplomatic endeavors 
of Herzl and the popular Zionist movement to that point.  As Jabotinsky noted, “We believed that 
we were making a new Zionism, a synthesis of Hibbat Zionism in the past and the political 
dream of Herzl (as the slogans of ‘practical work’ and the ‘conquest of positions in Eretz Israel’ 
were proclaimed at Helsingfores).”22  Jabotinsky lamented, however, that though this conference 
brought together all Russian Zionists, later youth movements of practical Zionism developed into 
Revisionists and grew at odds with their Zionist brethren.  
                                                          
18 Charles Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 26. 
19 Aliyah is the Hebrew word for “ascendance,” and these migrations were seen as an ascendance 
out of the diaspora.   
20 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32. 
21 Vladimir Jabotinsky and Brian Horowitz, Vladimir Jabotinsky’s Story of My Life (Detroit: 
Wayne State University, 2016), 90. 
22 Ibid.; Hibbat Zionism is the term for practical work of the land that predates Zionism as 
popularly understood after the work of Herzl.   
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Meanwhile, practical emigration continued.  Even as late as 1914, toward the end of the 
second aliyah between 1904 and 1914, Weizmann still maintained that Palestine was empty and 
ripe for the taking.  In a speech to the French Zionist Federation in Paris, he claimed, 
There is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, 
on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country.  What else is 
necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country?23 
 
The Zionist propagandist, Israel Zangwill, coined the term, “a land without a people for a people 
without a land.”24  According to historian Nur Masalha, Zionist writing is full of “ample 
evidence to suggest that from the outset…the attitude of the majority of the Zionist groups 
toward the Arab population ranged from indifference and patronizing superiority, to outright 
denial of their national rights.”25  This surge of emigration was filled with socialists who were 
“nurtured in the revolutionary atmosphere then prevalent in Russian intellectual circles.”26  This 
was the beginning of the Labor movement in Palestine, later headed by an immigrant of the 
second aliyah and long-time leader of the Zionist Labor Party, David Ben-Gurion.27  Jewish 
labor and Jewish labor alone was expected to build this new community.  Native Palestinians 
were not included and unrest between Arabs and Jews rose.  A socialist structure began to take 
hold in Palestine among the relatively small number of Jewish settlements at this time while the 
Zionist elites in Europe continued to search for political and diplomatic legitimacy.  The 
Ottoman Empire was naturally opposed to a foreign people seeking to create a separate society 
within their lands.  As the end of World War I drew near and an Ottoman defeat became 
                                                          
23 B. Litvinoff, editor, The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. 1, Series B (Jerusalem: 
Israel Universities Press, 1983), paper 24, 115-116. 
24 Nur Masalha, “The Historical Roots of the Palestinian Refugee Question,” in Palestinian 
Refugees: The Right of Return, edited by Naseer Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 37. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32. 
27 David Ben-Gurion was born David Gryn in Plonsk, Poland, then under Russian Tsarist rule, 16 
October 1886; see David Ben-Gurion, Memoirs (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1970). 
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imminent, however, the doors were opened to Zionist diplomatic pressure.   
The British aided this endeavor with the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which indicated 
that the British would use “their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement” of a “national 
home for the Jewish people [in Palestine].”28  Though the immigration of smaller numbers of 
Jews to Palestine began many years earlier, the international approval that came from the Balfour 
Declaration legitimized the colonizing efforts of political Zionists through diplomatic means.  
This was the goal of mainstream Zionism that saw the only path to a Jewish state in Palestine 
through international legitimacy and diplomatic efforts.  But by the 1920s, there was an offshoot 
of Zionist ideology with different goals that found its roots in the Helsingfores Programme and 
Eastern European Zionist aspirations.  Revisionist Zionism, as envisioned by its founder Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky, held an alternative view of how Zionism was to create a home in Palestine from 
those championed by its internationally recognized leaders.29   
The President of the WZO Chaim Weizmann and Revisionist founder Ze’ev Jabotinsky 
both believed themselves to be liberal and pro-British.  The WZO politically dealt with the 
European powers and particularly the British, who had been granted a Mandate over Palestine by 
the League of Nations.  Weizmann, even as late as 1939, signed his letters to the British High 
Commissioner for Palestine “I have the honor to remain Your Excellency’s obedient Servant.”30  
The principle Revisionist document written by Jabotinsky outlined his stance on the British: 
Our attitude towards the Mandatory Government is based on two factors: we believe in 
the integrity and justice of the British people… but there is another factor: the 
                                                          
28 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 93. 
29 Ze’ev Jabotinsky was born Vladimir Jabotinsky in Odessa, Russia on October 17, 1880.  Like 
many Zionists, he changed his name from his Russian birth name to a Hebrew name, Ze’ev; see 
“Biography of Ze’ev Jabotinsky,” Jabotinsky Institute in Israel, accessed 25 February 2015, 
http://jabotinsky.org/Site/home/default.asp 
30 “Dr. Weizmann’s Letter of June 4, 1939,” in “Contemporary Jewish Record,” Vol. II, No. 4, 
July-August 1939, AP USA, 70. 
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cooperation of interest.  It is not true that England is doing us a favour, without benefit to 
herself.  Moreover, in the Mediterranean – England’s corridor to the East – where both on 
the eastern and southern shores there exists a danger of anti-European tendencies, the 
Jews are building the only mainstay which is morally affiliated with Europe and forever 
will be part and parcel of Europe…31 
 
Jabotinsky clearly saw a Jewish state requiring the assistance of the British and international 
cooperation and believed it to be a part of Europe, like his mainstream contemporaries, but there 
is some suspicion of the world power in his words.  The revision of political Zionism, then, was 
a militaristic outlook that did not rely too much on the diplomatic method.  
The difference was in the views Weizmann and Jabotinsky held on how to obtain their 
objectives and the vision for what the Jewish state was to become.  The WZO believed in “self-
restraint,” or havaglah, and continued “systematic collaboration with…the middle-class non-
Revisionist conservative right.”32  These mainline Zionists, such as the established Labor Party, 
were interested in collectivism and a form of Marxist socialism.33  Their Jewish state was to be 
built through labor and social policies.  In contrast, Jabotinsky and the Revisionists saw the new 
state being built on the sword and through “bourgeois urban development” with an 
understanding that Zionism could never survive as a minority in Palestine.34  Diplomacy could 
not, in itself, provide for the establishment of the homeland, though Jabotinsky eagerly sought 
the assistance of established world powers.  For a man like Jabotinsky, the future had to be 
earned the hard way.  
The Revisionists have been termed “the radical right” and “extremist.”  In a study of this 
radical movement, Israeli Historian Ehud Sprinzak made a connection between radical right-
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wing extremism in America, first studied after the anti-communist extremism following the 
Second World War, and those movements in Europe.35  American radical right-wing extremism, 
as in Europe, was born out of ultra-nationalism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism and socialism.  
This was coupled with an overwhelming new idea that the Western democracy that had become 
commonplace could be fixed with something new.  The comparison stops there, however, and 
the difference between the American phenomenon and the European lay in their roots 
historically, as well as the range of ideology.  In America, right wing extremism was largely 
local and saw the problem of democracy as correctable, only taking issue with some of the 
components of Western government.  In Europe, the movement had become a sociocultural 
phenomenon and was based in the idea that Western democracy as a whole was flawed.  In the 
atmosphere of the events in the early twentieth century, alternatives to democracy altogether 
could be possible.  These included the Spanish Civil War, the rise of Hitler and Nazism, 
Mussolini and Italian Fascism, the fall of both the Russian and Habsburg empires in the early 
decades, and a growing ultra-national ideology.  One other comparison between the American 
and European radical ideologies was the xenophobic nature shared between them.  Though 
American extremists could be antisemitic and of course the Zionists were not, the shared anti-
alien, anti-communist, and ethnically discriminating nature of the two can be compared.  This is 
part of the sociological phenomenon that is radical right-wing political ideology and what 
formed the basis of later Revisionist identification of the native Palestinians.36  The Revisionists 
had to contend these ideals against the more mainstream Zionists that sought control of their 
collective destinies in Palestine.   
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The history of the early movement and its goals as opposed to mainstream Zionism help 
to understand the evolution out of Jabotinsky’s Revisionism to what became a truly radical, even 
“terrorist,” movement during the 1948 war.37  In Eastern Europe at the turn of the century, 
antisemitism flourished.  After his Western education in Italy and Switzerland, Jabotinsky 
remained in Eastern Europe as a Russian Journalist as he developed his Zionist beliefs amidst the 
violence against Jews.  A poet, writer, philosopher and a “powerful speaker with a magnetic 
personality despite his mild professorial appearance,” Jabotinsky was high-minded and in touch 
with the issues of the world, particularly as they pertained to the Jews.38  The pogroms against 
the Jews of Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as the Easter 
pogrom of 1903 in Kishinev, Russia, strongly affected him as it did many other Eastern 
European Jews.39  Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz said that “the man of the East cannot take 
Americans [or other Westerners] seriously,” because they had not experienced the violence and 
transformation of their values as had Eastern Europeans.40  Citing Milosz, Anna Applebaum 
wrote that “murder became ordinary during wartime…and was even regarded as legitimate if it 
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was carried out on behalf of the resistance.”41  This was the beginning of the snowball effect that 
shaped the future of Revisionist Zionism.   
Jabotinsky was immersed in the Zionist idea and began to make a name for himself early 
in the twentieth century.   He became active in Russian politics and fought for the rights of Jews 
as a minority in Russia.  He was also elected to the sixth Zionist Congress held that same year in 
1903, which was also the final appearance of Theodor Herzl.  Other future mainstream Zionist 
leaders moved to Western Europe and then to Palestine at a much younger age and remained less 
affected by the waves of anti-Jewish violence that shaped Jabotinsky.  David Ben-Gurion, who 
had emigrated to Palestine in 1906 at the age of twenty, admitted in his memoirs that 
“antisemitic feeling had little to do with [his] dedication [to Zionism]” and he “personally never 
suffered antisemitic persecution.”42  Herein lies the main reason for the early twentieth century 
split in Zionist secular discourse.  There was a change in the “basic legitimations that had 
[previously grounded] collective Jewish self-understanding.”43  Identity of what it meant to be a 
Zionist, or even Jewish in the twentieth century, was being challenged and reshaped.  
Ben-Gurion, however, straddled a fence between mainline Zionist beliefs in socialist 
agendas and international legitimacy and the practical and forceful acquisition of the future 
Jewish state.  Only a couple of years after reaching Palestine, Ben-Gurion, working as a 
settlement laborer, helped to found a self-defense force called Hashomer (‘The Watchmen’) to 
protect Jews against the local Arabs.44  These early conflicts between Arabs and Jews living in 
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Palestine had their roots in labor Zionist policies.  Though Ben-Gurion was more closely allied to 
the mainstream search for international acceptance, as a pragmatist he felt the need for direct 
action in the defense of the Jewish people and for the possibility of a Jewish state in Palestine.  
Jabotinsky had also already begun to split away from mainstream Zionist thought with an 
Eastern European brand of defensive Zionism.  He adopted a more militaristic outlook and saw a 
need to involve Jews in the Allied cause of World War I to leave a Jewish mark on what he saw 
as an inevitable victory and the end of the Ottoman Empire.45  This would help secure the Jewish 
claim to the land and earn favor with the Allies after the war.   
Jabotinsky eventually demanded a Jewish Legion in the British Army to fight in Palestine 
and led that unit himself in 1917.  For his work in this endeavor, Jabotinsky gained the favor of 
the British Foreign Secretary Balfour, pushing him towards the decision to author the declaration 
that legitimized Zionism.46  Ben-Gurion, having been in Palestine for about a decade working as 
a socialist journalist, also joined the Jewish Legion.  The idea of the Jewish fighting force was 
opposed by most mainstream Zionists who were more concerned about a Jewish failure in the 
war effort in Palestine than the fact that it “might be the first real step towards realization of the 
Zionist dream.”47  If the legion had failed, the Zionist leadership felt that political legitimacy 
would be lost.  This rift defined future Revisionist thinking: they were about action, whereas the 
mainstream did “what…was expected of them rather than holding out for what they believed 
in.”48  The differences were clear and two factions of Zionism were coming into focus. 
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 After the war and the declaration by Balfour, the ideologies of the two Zionist groups 
continued to be divergent.  Ben-Gurion was gaining favor in the Weizmann-led WZO while 
Jabotinsky was crafting his ideas for how Zionism was to deal with the Arab presence in 
Palestine.  Zionism had declared, quite emphatically by this point, that Palestine was to be the 
future home of the Jewish people.  However, there remained a large population of Palestinian 
Arabs in the region that were opposed to the Zionist agenda.  The split of Revisionism from the 
mainstream and Jabotinsky’s concepts on solving the problem of these native Palestinians started 
with a crucial document, “The Iron Wall.” 
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CHAPTER 3:  JABOTINSKY and the IRON WALL 
The memoirs of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Shamir, Lehi commander and future premier of 
Israel, show the differences in thought, approach, and influence of the divergent Zionist 
ideologies.  Ben-Gurion explained that the Revisionists “had little notion of the…necessity of 
obeying directives from a centralized source.”49  In contrast, Shamir extolled the virtues of the 
Revisionist founder by describing the division between Jabotinsky and the Zionist leadership. 
[Jabotinsky], for ever the target of strong feelings, he was at once hated, worshipped, 
feared and admired:  accepted as a supreme leader by some, he was rejected by others as 
a dangerous extremist whose concepts and supporters, if allowed to prevail, would 
degrade and destroy the essence of the Zionist cause.50   
 
The use of words such as “extremist,” or Shamir’s claims to be “fascinated by the lives of Lenin, 
Trotsky…and their terrorist activities,” shows an early indoctrination into what is later termed 
radical.51  Though Jabotinsky was a part of the early Zionist movement and chose his own 
Revisionist path opposed to the mainstream, later Revisionists like Shamir were influenced by 
his outlying school of thought and looked on him as the trailblazer.  In 1923 he founded a 
Revisionist youth group called Betar in Poland.  Years after fighting in Palestine for the British, 
and the year following the start of the official British Mandate over what was to be the Jewish 
state, he was still concerned with the militarization of European Jewry.  Early twentieth century 
notions of ultra-nationalism and militarism were at the heart of this form of Zionist thought.   
Also in 1923, Jabotinsky wrote his Revisionist Zionist manifesto, “The Iron Wall.”  This 
was the founding document of what became the “Iron Wall Doctrine.”  The concept of the Iron 
Wall is a perpetual state of war.  Jabotinsky felt that there could “be no voluntary agreement 
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between [the Zionists] and the Palestine Arabs.”52  The only way to complete the Zionist vision 
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, according to Jabotinsky, was to put up a figurative iron wall 
between the Jewish people and the Arabs, and subsequently remove all hope the Arabs had of 
ridding themselves of the Jews.  It is important to point out that this did not necessarily mean a 
physical separation of the two populations though, to a large extent that is what occurred.  The 
concept, rather, was in a cultural, economic, and military separation and dominance of the Arab 
Palestinians.  “It is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can 
make no breach in the iron wall,” that there could finally be an agreement.53  Until such time, 
“what is impossible is a voluntary agreement” on land, on economics, or on rule.  In the same 
manifesto he stated that because a colonized people would be expected to violently rebel, there 
will be an expectation of continuous conflict.54  Though in his essay he believes that there can 
eventually be peace between the Jews and the Arabs, it can only come through the structures of 
this Iron Wall Doctrine.  He claimed that the Jews will be more than willing to be generous in 
peace settlements and acquiescence to Palestinian rights.  The problem, however, lies in his 
thesis.  If Zionism can only exist with an iron wall and negotiations can be made only when the 
Arabs have lost all hope, the return of hope is doomed to repeat that process.  Thus, perpetual 
war formed the centerpiece of this ideology, and surely the main extract that has carried the 
Revisionists ever since.   
An unending state of war is thematic to this doctrine because Jabotinsky considered it 
“utterly impossible to eject the Arabs from Palestine.”55  His vision noted that “there will always 
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be two nations in Palestine—which is good enough for me, provided the Jews become the 
majority.”56  Jabotinsky called upon his readers to take account of all other historical instances in 
which a colonizing people entered an occupied territory.  Never has this worked peacefully and, 
in his understanding, it was unthinkable to expect the Palestinians to accept Jewish immigration 
to create a majority in Palestine, which was the Zionist vision, without fighting for their own 
self-determination.  But if, as he believed and has been proven true, there will always be two 
populations, the prophetic Jabotinsky was expecting a constant state of quarrel.  What is 
important is that this pertains not only to colonizers but to neighbors or peaceful coequals.  He 
ends this segment, entitled “Voluntary Agreement Not Possible,” with the point that “Every 
native population, civilised or not, regards its lands as its national home, of which it is the sole 
master, and it wants to retain that mastery always; it will refuse to admit not only new masters 
but, even new partners or collaborators.”57  This line embodies his ideological split from the 
mainstream Zionist organization.  Though he did believe in international legitimacy, as it was 
unwise to seek domination over a native people without some consent or recognition, he 
understood that diplomatic and peaceful measures toward the Palestinians were not the 
appropriate route to take.  They would not accept “new masters” nor would they accept the 
peaceful olive branch if it meant that immigration of a foreign people would continue to occupy 
their homeland.   
Jabotinsky’s final points in “The Iron Wall” lead into what later became an anticolonial 
venture in Revisionism.  It is important to note, however, that it did take years and deceitful 
circumstances for what he wrote to evolve into something he did not see in his initial writing.  
But as he exclaimed that Zionism must continue on this path or quit their mission altogether, the 
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latter not seen as an option for the Zionist Jews, he pointed to the British backing that had been 
afforded them through the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration.  He said “their value to us is 
that outside Power has undertaken to create in the country such conditions of administration and 
security that if the native population should desire to hinder our work, they will find it 
impossible.”58  He remarked, with emphasis, “And we are all of us, without any exception, 
demanding day after day that this outside Power, should carry out this task vigorously and with 
determination.”59  International, particularly British, aid in colonizing efforts were paramount to 
the Zionist realization of a Jewish state in Palestine according to Jabotinsky.  However, it was 
important to him that the Jewish Zionists maintain their own self-sufficiency as it pertained to 
the iron wall’s placement between themselves and the Arabs.  He thought it imprudent to rely 
wholly on the British.  On that subject, Jabotinsky said: 
We all demand that there should be an iron wall.  Yet we keep spoiling our own case, by 
talking about “agreement” which means telling the Mandatory Government that the 
important thing is not the iron wall, but discussions.  Empty rhetoric of this kind is 
dangerous.  And that is why it is not only a pleasure but a duty to discredit it and to 
demonstrate that it is both fantastic and dishonest.60 
 
He also made the point that he and his descendants “shall never do anything contrary to the 
principle of equal rights,” a statement that can be interpreted as contradictory to the face of the 
doctrine as it came to exist in the future.  This leads into the discussion of what the Revisionist 
founder wrote on the subject seven months later, an essay designed to justify his thesis titled 
“The Ethics of the Iron Wall.” 
 In November 1923, Jabotinsky followed his original Revisionist essay with an ethical 
justification of his stance on the future of the Zionist cause in Palestine.  He provided analogies 
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and a certain logic that both attacked the diplomatic ideologies of the mainstream Zionists as 
well as painted the Zionist movement, and world Jewry in general, as “homeless” victims.  He 
began with expanding on the ideas brought forth at the Helsingfores Programme that guaranteed 
the equality of citizens and self-determination for all peoples everywhere.  By this logic, he 
stated, the Arabs could not be “an impartial judge” of the merits of that program because in this 
situation they were “one of the contending parties.”61  He then brought the question back to 
whether even “neighbors” would be welcomed by the natives of Palestine, let alone colonizers, 
to which he replied in the negative.  “So why should a nation that is perfectly content with its 
isolation admit to its country even good neighbours in any considerable number?  ‘I want neither 
your honey nor your sting,’ is a reasonable answer.”62  He admitted that it would be naïve to 
expect the Palestinians to believe Jews would be any different than previous historical episodes 
in which a mixing of populations occurred, which he pointed out have all been violent failures in 
which “a minority always suffers everywhere.”63  Attacking the mainstream base of Zionism for 
their naiveté on this matter, he said “it is incredible what political simpletons Jews are.  They 
shut their eyes to one of the most elementary rules of life, that you must not ‘meet halfway’ those 
who do not want to meet you.”64  The beginning of his justification was more of an indictment of 
diplomatic Zionism and a clear removal of his Revisionist ideologies from what he had come to 
detest.   
 Jabotinsky’s analogies on the subject show an interesting balance between regard for 
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humanity and self-interest, namely the self-interest of the Jews involved in the Zionist cause.  
His treatise, in just a few lines on this balance, was quite clear on the high regard with which he 
held Zionists’ right to self-determination where they so choose: 
Each man who passes my window in the street has a right to live only in so far as he 
recognises my right to live; but if he is determined to kill me, I cannot admit that he has 
any right to live.  And that is true also of nations.  Otherwise, the world would become a 
jungle of wild beasts, where not only the weak, but also those who have any scrap of 
feeling would be exterminated.65 
 
His next paragraph explained how the “world must be a place of co-operation and mutual 
goodwill,” and thus he used an analogy and self-serving logic to explain how the Zionists should 
be granted the right to land in Palestine.66  “There is no morality, no ethics that concedes the 
right of a glutton to gorge.”67  That is how he began his explanation of how the “homeless” Jews 
of the world should be given equitable right to land somewhere.  If they were a people without a 
home, those who have enough land to spare should.  The Arabs, he contested, had populations 
covering land that equaled half of Europe, from Morocco to Iraq.  Using a Talmudic tale, he told 
the story of two men that came along a cloth, both claiming to have found it.  One is a gentleman 
and wants only half, while the other is an obstinate that wants it all.  In the end, a judge 
determines that since only one half is contested due to the gentleman’s agreement that half 
belongs to the obstinate, they would split the contested half giving the gentleman only on quarter 
of the cloth.  This analogy, in Jabotinsky’s appraisal, shows how concessions and gentlemanly 
behavior in the diplomatic arena are for naught.  “It is a very fine thing to be a gentleman, but it 
is no reason for being an idiot…There is not much that we can concede to Arab nationalism, 
without destroying Zionism.  We cannot abandon the effort to achieve a Jewish majority in 
                                                          
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
25 
 
Palestine.”68   
 As for his justification of creating in Palestine a Jewish majority by force, he explained 
that taking land from the natives was actually enacting justice on the order of humanitarian 
considerations.  He traced “the root of the evil to [the fact] that we are seeking to colonise a 
country against the wishes of its population, in other words, by force.”69  Once again, Jabotinsky 
in no way hid from the fact that the Zionist mission was a forceful colonization of a native 
populated land, something Weizmann was reluctant to admit, or even notice.  Choosing another 
land to inhabit was out of the question.  Jabotinsky’s principle rested on the fact that all places 
were inhabited; “There are no more uninhabited islands in the world.  In every oasis there is a 
native population settled from times immemorial, who will not tolerate an immigrant majority or 
an invasion of outsiders.”70  Thus, Jabotinsky admitted the immorality of any landless people 
seeking a national home in a world occupied in every corner of every continent.   
 Jabotinsky contended, however, that from the Jewish point of view, this morality had a 
“particularly interesting appearance.”71  The homeless Jews were literally scattered throughout 
the world, while the Arab populations enjoyed sovereignty over several nations.  The inequality 
is what he called into question.  “It is an act of simple justice to alienate part of their land from 
those nations who are numbered among the great landowners of the world, in order to provide a 
place of refuge for a homeless, wandering people.”72  As stated in his previous work and in this 
essay, Jabotinsky fully expected the resistance of the Arabs to this sort of logic.  But his 
understanding, coming from a culture in diaspora removed from their home two millennia prior, 
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was that “the principle of self-determination does not mean that if someone has seized a stretch 
of land it must remain in his possession for all time, and that he who was forcibly ejected from 
his land must always remain homeless.”73  This is a particularly interesting concept when one 
considers what he and his successors have advocated was a return to something that used to be 
theirs by the expulsion of those who in successive decades they no longer allow to return.  But at 
the time, for Jabotinsky this was justice.  “Justice that is enforced does not cease to be justice.”74 
Later, in 1940, Jabotinsky wrote about the plight then plaguing the Jews of Europe in his 
book The War and the Jews.75  In this work, he focused mainly on the quandary of those Jews 
remaining in diaspora, stuck in what historian Timothy Snyder has dubbed “the Bloodlands” of 
Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states and Western Russia, which during the Second 
World War were the lands fought over between Stalin and Hitler and for centuries held the 
world’s largest population of Jews.76  However, he also discussed the growing conflict between 
the Zionists and the native Palestinians, and he had much to say on the subject.  He remained true 
to his convictions about the rights of the Arabs that he mentioned in “The Iron Wall” and that it 
would come after the Jewish state was established.  He argued that the idea of a Jewish majority 
oppressing the Arabs was a “fallacy.”77  He claimed, referring to the Palestinians, that it was not 
a “tragedy to constitute a minority” unless as a minority everywhere, as the Jews were in 
diaspora.78  What Jabotinsky forgot, however, was that his doctrine expected resistance which 
would have to be put down by force.  Is that not the definition of oppression? 
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 In “The Iron Wall” Jabotinsky clearly stated that Zionists were “Jewish colonist[s]” and 
that the Arabs were oppressed.79  The movement to Palestine with the support of the British 
Empire was a colonizing action and Zionist “colonials” represented Western interference.80  
After World War I, the British claimed a Mandate over the territory of historic Palestine through 
the League of Nations, a control they would hold onto until the founding of Israel in 1948.  
Jabotinsky’s concepts regarding how he viewed Zionists as “colonials” resembles the later work 
of Albert Memmi, who put labels and definitions to a more complicated imperial and 
anticolonial struggle than as previously defined.  Through these definitions, the British were the 
overriding colonizers and the Palestinians were the colonized.  While the Zionists were the 
physical colonials on the ground with British assistance, they were in the position to both 
subjugate the colonized and later feel disenfranchised by the colonizer.  Put simply, the British 
were the colonizing force, the Arabs were colonized, and the Zionists were somewhere in 
between.  In “The Iron Wall,” Jabotinsky understood the concept of violence within an 
anticolonialist context when considering the reactions of Arabs in Palestine.  He wrote that 
“every native population in the world resists colonists as long as it has… hope of being able to 
rid itself of the danger of being colonized.”81  Once again, this is the basis for perpetual war.  
Jabotinsky’s early epiphany on violence saw it as an inevitable part of an anticolonial 
struggle.  “Decolonization is always a violent phenomenon…the replacing of a certain ‘species’ 
of men by another ‘species’ of men,” referring to how the Palestinians would be expected to 
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react to the Zionists’ forcible colonization.82  It is these ideas that have led some of their 
contemporaries and later historians to describe the Revisionists as radical or even fascist.83  That 
was a struggle, however, that became a part of Jabotinsky’s legacy and not necessarily of his 
actions as he did not live long enough to see the final evolution of what Revisionist Zionism was 
to become.84  In Shamir’s words, “Jabotinsky was never extreme or dogmatic” and “understood 
the Arab claim to the country, but believed that it was less valid than that of the Jewish 
people.”85  Some former socialist Revisionists, however, were more aligned with fascist notions 
in the 1920s and created complications within the Revisionist organization that caused the later 
splits of radical military groups.  Those groups outgrew their colonizing roots and British 
dependency as they adopted a more anticolonial attitude.  The anticolonial aspects of later 
Revisionism were in contrast to Jabotinsky’s ideals, largely because they were able to flower at a 
time when Zionism was well established within Palestine.  
The beginning of the anticolonial movement started as a fledgling response to the British 
change in orientation that departed from their prior wholesale support for the Jews in Palestine.  
The Arab riots of 1929 resulted in a series of reports by the British on the causes of the situation 
and the potential remedies within the Mandate.  The Shaw Report of March 1930 “identified 
Zionist immigration and land practices as the reasons for the 1929 riots.”86  The report further 
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declared that a “landless and discontented class is being created,” referring to the Palestinians 
who were being left out of the growing Jewish economic structure, and it concluded that the only 
remedy to this unrest was the limitation of land purchases or transfer to people who were not 
Arab, namely the Jews.87  This was clearly a redirection of British policy from that of the Balfour 
Declaration over a decade prior.  The new policy clearly limited the ability of Jews to create their 
own state.  In October of the same year, the Passfield White Paper of 1930 criticized Jewish 
immigration and land seizures.  It also called for consideration of all unemployed persons in the 
region, particularly the Arabs as it pertained to labor, arguing that concessions should be made 
by the Jewish leaders in that regard.88  This was another affront to the Labor Zionists.  Those of 
the second aliyah did not want to hire Arab labor and saw the creation of a socialist proletariat on 
the back of a Jewish only workforce.  The British government had done an about face in its 
support of the Jews in Palestine and the Revisionists began to increasingly adopt an anticolonial 
hardline.  Jabotinsky still held out hope for cooperation with the British and wanted to give them 
a “last chance since the real blame lay with the errors of the official Zionist leadership.”89 
This first crisis between British support and Jabotinsky’s Revisionism was exacerbated 
by the new maximalist wing of the organization led by a former labor socialist turned 
Revisionist, Abba Achimeir.  Achimeir, an admirer of Benito Mussolini, leaned more toward a 
fascist orientation for the Revisionist group and began the radicalization of Revisionist 
Zionism.90  He had even sought an alliance with Italy since fascism had become attractive by 
their ability to uproot “distasteful social theories such as communism in the West.”91  However, 
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Jabotinsky openly rejected the idea of fascism and clung to his liberal beliefs.  In February of 
1931, the Passfield White Paper had been repudiated by a letter from British Prime Minister 
Ramsey MacDonald to Weizmann.  This was a positive event for the Zionist cause as Jewish 
immigration was allowed to continue unabated and their numbers in Palestine swelled well in to 
the 1930s.92  In spite of that good news, however, Jabotinsky’s Revisionism continued to split.  
The reversal allowed the Jewish population to more than double, to approximately 370,000, over 
the next several years but Jabotinsky held on to a classical colonialist vision that involved 
practical British support.  Jabotinsky even looked for outside assistance in a way to put pressure 
on the British but the radical elements of Revisionism had already given up that hope.  
According to Achimeir, activism through a liberation movement in Palestine became more 
valuable.   
The split within Revisionism was increased when Jabotinsky was forced to lead the 
Revisionists in political alignment after officially seceding from the main Zionist organization.  
At the seventeenth Zionist Congress in 1931, he put to vote a resolution that would call for the 
declaration of a Jewish state as Zionism’s primary goal.  That resolution, surprisingly, did not 
pass and the Revisionists seceded from the “band of spiritual bastards” that Jabotinsky “despised 
coldly and greatly.”93  Jabotinsky still believed, however, in the “integrity of the world, in the 
power of justice,” while the maximalists in Palestine grew weary and more radical.94  His hold 
on the movement he had founded was slipping through his fingers by the early 1930s. 
In October 1931, Achimeir and his Betar youth, along with other radical leaders in 
Palestine like Uri Zvi Greenberg, created the League of Sicarii in order to formulate a direct 
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action against the British.  At their first meeting they discussed the possibility of recruitment and 
taking up arms against the British in Palestine.  Though they failed in this early endeavor, in a 
practical sense, the League did lay the groundwork for what would become the basis for 
maximalist radical shifts in Revisionist thinking.  The Irgun had already split from the Haganah, 
the progenitors of the IDF, in 1931 and became the military wing of the Revisionist movement in 
Palestine.  Militancy was becoming the norm.  Jabotinsky by this point was fundamentally more 
conservative relative to these radical elements that had grown within his organization.  However, 
he felt the need to maintain control by ruling in favor of the League of Sicarii.  He even wrote 
controversial articles that agreed with their radical beliefs, lest he lose authority over them.  He 
wrote that it was time for “the youth to learn to shoot” and “without militarism there would be no 
hope for Zionism.”95  At the same time he finally officially accused the British of wrongdoing 
and referred to them as a “gang of foreigners” attempting to assume permanent power over 
Palestine in a breach of their promise in the Balfour Declaration.96  These, however, were only 
words.  But Achimeir was the real flint that ignited the spark of violent action in the group.  He 
had lauded political assassination as early as the 1920s.  Jabotinsky refrained from supporting 
ideas such as these where he could but it seemed, even to him, that his grasp of Revisionist 
leadership was continuing to loosen.  He wanted a balanced approach that shared Achimeir’s 
pragmatic tactics without sharing his radical ideology.  He felt that Zionism needed action and 
militarism but could not exist as an underground and illegal movement.  “Sometimes diplomacy 
should be used, at other times adventurism; occasionally the spirit of peace, and on other 
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occasions – the spirit of war.”97  The early 1930s were a torrent of dissolution and failed attempts 
to cling to a collective ideology for the Revisionist organization. 
Jabotinsky’s balanced approach led to an unlikely friendship that developed out of 
surprising agreements and negotiations.  In October 1934, he and Labor leader and staunch critic 
of Revisionism Ben-Gurion held a series of secret meetings in London to discuss agreements that 
would bring the two factions together.  They met almost daily and during their first clandestine 
rendezvous they were initially surprised in that they could agree on more than expected, 
including, to some extent, a view for the future of Zionism and Jewish labor.  Over the course of 
these meetings, the two improbable allies “created a relationship of complete trust and 
confidence.”98  Earlier in the decade, Ben-Gurion had encountered Jabotinsky’s public speaking 
prowess and his visionary appeal at the 1930 World Congress of Labor Eretz Yisrael, the labor 
unions’ version of the Zionist conferences.99  He saw Jabotinsky as “one-dimensional and 
fascistic,” knowing that this was a man to fear in the power struggle for the soul of Zionism.100  
All the while, there was a level of respect and envy involved on the Labor leader’s part, and it 
was reciprocated by the Revisionist orator.  Jabotinsky even said that he would join the Labor 
Party, if it would change its name from Mapai to Mabai.  The issue to him was in the full 
Hebrew name, Party of Builders of the Land of Israel, “for he did not support any ideological or 
class organization, only a general body.”101  Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion discussed many things, 
leading to a set of agreements that both were very proud of, if only tentatively as Ben-Gurion felt 
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they may be “too good to be true.”102  In fact, he was right.  The agreements, which included 
forbidding “all acts of terror or violence in any shape or form,” were vehemently rejected by 
both parties.  The mainstream Zionists, for their part, wanted to maintain a distance from the 
Revisionists, who they called fascists.  Future Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok, who had 
just taken over control of the Jewish Agency’s political department, cabled Ben-Gurion 
explaining the outrage concerning the agreements.  He said that the “movement has been 
wounded and danger is very great…No reconciliation with fascist Zionism.”103  Though Ben-
Gurion’s credibility was tested by this move, he remained in a powerful position within Zionism.  
The same could not be said for Jabotinsky, who could feel his position of authority in the 
Revisionist movement slipping.  
As the 1930s wore on, Revisionist leaders continued to hold conferences and worked 
largely outside of Palestine.  Jabotinsky maintained work with other leaders and foreign 
governments, as well as the mainline Zionist organizations in Paris, London, and Vienna.  One 
important meeting was the founding of the New Zionist Organization (NZO) in September 1935 
in Vienna, Austria.  Jabotinsky presented his new vision for eradicating the diaspora with a plan 
that would immigrate over a million and a half Jews over the course of ten years.  His plan was 
comprised of three stages: a Jewish state, an exodus from the diaspora, and the creation of a 
national culture to affect the entire world.104  However, the old Zionist of action that had created 
the Jewish fighting legion in the First World War had become mere words and his radical 
contemporaries who were ideologically, and by this point ironically, forged out of his brand of 
Zionism became impatient.  He had lost control of them.  They had become intolerant of his 
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propensity to seek compromises.  The physical spark they needed came in 1936 and the path 
taken by some would change the Revisionist organization forever. 
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CHAPTER 4:  BORN OF FIRE 
From 1936 to 1939 an Arab revolt rocked Palestine, the consequences of which changed 
the Revisionist movement’s understanding of its own nationalism and self-identity.  Palestine 
had become a questionable asset to the British since the Arab resistance had crystallized into a 
three year uprising that was suppressed only at great cost.  Moreover, the Jews had continued 
their mass migration.  The increase in hostilities called for an increase in Revisionist action, even 
“partisan and terrorist activity.”105  Jabotinsky’s leadership was failing and his adherence to the 
mainstream Zionist doctrine of self-restraint became a divisive issue.  He was confronted by 
Achimeir at the Betar conference in Poland in 1936.  Achimeir believed social democratic 
principles would not win the Jewish state.  Jabotinsky had reverted to his original views and the 
beliefs of the WZO, that international acceptance and intervention in the Arab revolt were the 
only way to remain legitimate.  He was towing a line between his beliefs and the necessity to 
stay faithful to the rule of law and the power of the international community.  
In contrast, the Revisionists were emboldened by the conflagration.  Achimeir and some 
of his contemporaries in the Irgun felt that violence in retaliation against Arab violence was the 
answer and the only way to remain strong.  Jabotinsky had some doubts about self-restraint, but 
that only led him to look beyond the British to the Italians.  He believed that the British might 
surrender to Arab demands.106  This interest in Italian assistance interestingly did not bring him 
and Achimeir closer, even though the former had been enamored with the Mussolini regime.  
The difference in ideology had become too broad.  The rift got wider until, on 23 April 1937, the 
Revisionist organization snapped.  The Irgun, up to this point an illegal but reliable ally of the 
Haganah, broke into two factions.  The commander of the Irgun, Avraham Tehomi, like 
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Jabotinsky, believed in self-restraint and joined a faction of the Irgun to the Haganah forces.  
Under the leadership of a few of Achimeir’s radical disciples, including one of note, Avraham 
Stern, the remaining 1,500 in the Irgun’s ranks remained independent and advocated violence 
against the Arabs.  They built this new, wholly Revisionist Irgun on three core tenets.  “The fate 
of the Jewish nation will be decided by Jewish armed force on the soil of the homeland, the 
[Irgun] views as an ally any Jew supporting this aim, and the [Irgun] views as an ally any non-
Jew who recognizes the right of the Jewish people to the independence of its homeland.”107 
Anticolonial roots were beginning to take hold as the ideology of Irgun factions split the 
Revisionists.  This faction was connected to the militant NZO and Betar and the doctrine of self-
restraint was beginning to be completely rejected.  Even Jabotinsky directed that if there was a 
visible “tendency to attack Jews, do not exercise self-restraint!”108  The Revisionists now had a 
military wing that stood largely on its own in Palestine.  Though this version of the Revisionist 
Irgun was organizationally a failure due to miscommunication and financial distresses, the seed 
of a violent radicalism had been planted.  It had solidified the doctrine that physical force, not 
political or diplomatic will, would determine the future of the Jewish state and later militant 
groups would use that as their ideological base.  Jabotinsky still believed in political ends to 
compliment military means, and thus found himself on the outskirts of leadership before long.  
International backing was no longer sought and Jabotinsky, though the model for Revisionism, 
had become irrelevant.  Though the British Empire by this time had become the number one 
enemy of the Revisionists, they soon made matters much worse.  
The Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission Report in 1937 recommended that partitioning 
the land with only twenty percent allotted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, as 
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well as ceasing Jewish immigration, was the only path to peace.109  This was the first official 
mention of partitioning the land and it became the basis for future policy positions in Palestine.  
A virtual consensus was held publicly by Zionist leadership condemning these outcomes.  
Revisionists in particular were angered at the prospect and clung to the original maximalist goal 
of obtaining all of Palestine, or Eretz Yisrael.  That anger was compounded two years later by a 
British policy statement, known as the 1939 White Paper, which officially implemented a 
version of the suggested policies outlined in the Peel Commission Report.  This White Paper 
restricted Jewish immigration to a maximum of one-third the population of Palestine and 
regulated the Zionist acquisition of land “unless the Arabs of Palestine acquiesce to it.”110  The 
Zionists, particularly the Revisionists that had made it to Palestine, were angered by this 
encroachment on what they considered their birth right.   
Jabotinsky’s response was severe and at the same time oddly pleading.  In his book The 
War and the Jews he claimed that he had serious problems with Britain because of the White 
Paper.  He argued that the “Jews have been deeply hurt and injured by the White Paper of May 
1939…,” and continued by saying that the Arabs knew it was not necessarily a victory, merely a 
“stepping-stone for tomorrow’s renewed offensive.”111  In this chapter of his book, titled “The 
Ineffectual Bribe,” he argued that the function of the White Paper was as a bribe to the Arabs 
after three years of revolt.  The Arab and Zionist violence had brought that very crucial subject 
of a Jewish majority to the forefront.  He felt that the Arabs becoming a minority did not 
constitute a negative, but a Jewish majority was paramount in the Zionist vision.  He needed to 
reconcile how this would happen, or what would happen if it were not to come to pass.  
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However, even in 1940, apparently he saw statelessness for the Jewish people as a possible 
option, a “non-exodus solution.”112  In a proposal he called “national-personal autonomy,” he 
argued that an alternative to a Jewish state in Palestine might be that “all Jews who so desire will 
be registered in Dispersion as members of their own national community, will have their own 
schools, use their own language in public life, and feel equal to anyone else.”113  This is a 
remarkable shift from what Jabotinsky had championed for decades.  The fact that he could even 
think about advocating a continuation of the diaspora was a sign that his Zionist vision was 
fading.  He was also clearly encumbered by the realities in Europe at the time, with war between 
the Allies and the Axis, as well as the nations of Europe against the Jews.   
He did, however, still have solutions to the Palestine population problem that he saw as 
completely logical.  Jabotinsky felt that Palestine was plenty accommodating for many different 
peoples, including vast numbers of Jewish immigrants, in opposition to the findings of the 
British White Paper.  “The transformation of Palestine can be effected to the full without 
dislodging the Palestinian Arabs.  All current affirmations to the contrary are utterly 
incorrect.”114  He went on to explain that the population density of France, Germany, and other 
European countries could fit millions, while in 1940 there were only approximately 1.5 million 
in Palestine, which included Jews, Arabs, Transjordanians.115  He felt there to be “margin enough 
left for Palestine to absorb the better part of East-Central Europe’s ghetto… without approaching 
even the moderate density of France… Unless the Arabs choose to go away of their own accord, 
there is no need for them to emigrate.”116  Proposals like this were at the core of Revisionist 
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discourse and Iron Wall Doctrine.  The end of the Arab Revolt and the issue of the British policy 
in 1939 brought the group that Jabotinsky once controlled beyond the point of no return.  
By the end of the decade, and the introduction of British policy that flew in the face of 
the accepted Revisionist vision for Palestine and a Jewish majority, the anticolonial sentiments of 
the fringe groups and paramilitaries had reached a fever pitch.  The Irgun split once again.  One 
of the more gifted intellectuals and ideologically driven Revisionists, Avraham Stern, created a 
new and more radical paramilitary wing that would target British interests in a more direct 
way.117  This new group, Lehi, had been synthesized out of an ideological evolution from 
Jabotinsky’s Revisionist Zionism to an anticolonial one bent on political violence. 
Avraham Stern, originally from Poland though he immigrated to Palestine by 1925 at 
seventeen, was one of the radical disciples of Abba Achimeir, though he rejected Achimeir’s 
fascist orientation.  However, like Achimeir and the other hardline radicals in the early 1930s, 
Stern saw a sort of biblical calling to the fight for the Jewish state.  The Jews had been 
subjugated throughout history, but heroic actions like the Jewish revolt at Bar-Kochba against 
the Romans gave a biblical focal point for the rallying cry of the radical Zionists.  “Israel was 
defeated, but not shamed: Judaea was subjugated, but not profaned.”118  There was an optimistic 
side to martyrdom and violent struggle that was widely admired in Jewish circles.  These 
romantic notions envisaged by Stern, coupled with a further radicalization, led him to break from 
the Irgun for the first time in 1937.  Stern gained influence among the most radical elements of 
the Irgun as many saw Jabotinsky pandering to the British and to the Western democracies.  
Jabotinsky’s leadership had been in question since well before the Arab revolt and, even in spite 
of Achimeir’s growing influence, many of Stern’s followers saw Stern as “the first of the 
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Hebrew Freedom Fighters in the homeland.”119  Stern had even gone as far as to attempt to make 
a deal, in vain, with the Axis powers during World War II against their common enemy, the 
British.120  The anticolonial element of Revisionism, personified by Lehi, or the Stern Gang as 
the British called them, had come to the forefront.   
The British eventually caught up with Stern and he was killed in 1942 in a raid on a Tel 
Aviv apartment in which he was hiding.  Stern and his group had been on a violent spree that 
included the killing of several Jewish constables, including the Deputy Superintendent of Tel 
Aviv police, and an attack on a member of the Palestine Labor Council.121  His actions had been 
more and more radical, and these attacks on fellow Zionists show the complexities of the 
relationships among the many Jewish groups in Palestine.  His death led the press to believe that 
this had “put an end to the activities of the band.”122  That left future Prime Minister of Israel 
Yitzhak Shamir to lead the gang with its fully developed anticolonial ideology.123  Shamir 
escaped Mazra Prison in Acre, an old crusader fort, just months after the death of Stern to take 
this leadership position.  Shamir, also a convert from the Irgun who had immigrated to Palestine 
from Eastern Europe, had taken the name “Michael” as an underground alias when he joined 
Lehi as a tribute to the “heroes of the Irish revolution.”124  Shamir had read about Michael 
Collins, the director of intelligence for the IRA during the Irish revolution, when he was a boy 
along with the works of the Communist leaders of the early twentieth century.  Shamir, formerly 
Yitzhak Yezernitsky, grew up in what is now Belarus in a secular Jewish family under Russian 
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rule, much like his mentor Jabotinsky.  His indoctrination into Revisionist Zionism came early as 
he joined Jabotinsky’s Betar youth movement in 1929 at the age of fourteen, sparked by the Arab 
riots that occurred that year.  In a political speech in high school in Russia, he explained to 
classmates that “he who wants a country has to fight for it.”125  More cerebral and ideologically 
driven than simply militaristic, by 1942 he was an ideal candidate to play a leading role in 
Revisionist Zionism. 
By the time Shamir had become leader of Lehi, little of his beliefs had changed.  He was 
a staunch Jabotinsky supporter and he later recalled, “as for myself, nothing I have learned since 
I was a young man in Poland has altered, or in any way lessened or diluted, my belief in the 
logic, the justice and, yes, the grandeur of the objectives, as Jabotinsky articulated them, of 
Zionist activism.”126  However, by 1940, the year Jabotinsky passed away, the Revisionist 
founder had become largely irrelevant as a leader of the radical movement.  Shamir had really 
become the disciple of Stern, a man that claimed the enemy to the Jews was not necessarily the 
Arabs or even Hitler, but the British.  This echoed the disdain he felt for the White Paper of 
1939.  He continued the work of Lehi for the next several years and into the fight for Israeli 
Independence.  Building on the work of Stern, Shamir used tactics that differed from Lehi’s 
militant Zionist contemporaries.  The Irgun’s approach was using large scale attacks to send a 
message, such as the bombing of the British military command post at the King David Hotel on 
22 July 1946.127  Lehi sought more specific targets that it deemed threatening, including the 
assassination of the British Middle East official Lord Moyne for his perceived anti-Zionist 
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rhetoric and of course, the fact that he was British.128   
Though they differed on the means of reaching certain ends, Lehi mirrored Irgun in their 
desire for sending a message while ensuring their choice of targets would also affect change, 
evidenced by their first victim.  Lord Moyne, Sir Walter Edward Guinness, was the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Deputy Minister of State in the Middle East, and Minister Resident in the 
Middle East for the British Empire during the early 1940s.129  His speeches were seen by Lehi as 
having antisemitic tones and support for the Arabs in Palestine.  Stern and Shamir saw him as a 
“personification of British power” and his position in the British colonial government had indeed 
given him control over policies in Palestine.130  This made him a natural target for Lehi, which 
had “less to do with [his actions and speeches] than with his status.”131  In reality, however, 
Moyne had been in favor of partition with the recognition of a Jewish state and much of his 
perceived antisemitism had been taken out of context.  Regardless, the British power broker was 
seen as a threat and needed to be removed.  
Stern had planned Moyne’s assassination and, after his death at the hands of the British, 
Shamir carried it out.  On 6 November 1944, two Lehi gunmen waited outside of Moyne’s Cairo 
home as he returned from his office and shot him three times in the chest while he was still 
sitting in his car.132  Shamir answered in his autobiography the question, “did Lehi really believe 
that it could throw the British out of the country in the face of Haganah hostility and British 
determination to suppress and, if possible, uproot it?  Yes, we believed this and I think we also 
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succeeded.”133  According to Shamir, “it was Lehi that first served notice on the British and 
made good its warnings that nothing would be permitted to stand in the way of the achievement 
of Jewish independence in the Land of Israel, nothing and no one.”134  He described this new 
tactic of political assassination as “part of [Stern’s] total concept of how we should fight, not just 
the British in Palestine but the British Empire as such: to try to put out of action the people who 
made policy and moved the pieces on the Palestine board.”135  By 1948, circumstances led this 
tactic of Lehi to target a new threat, the UN Mediator Count Bernadotte.   
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CHAPTER 5:  PARTITION and CIVIL WAR 
In November 1947, the United Nations approved a Partition Plan that would remove the 
British Mandate and administer a separation of Palestine into “independent Arab and Jewish 
states.”136  This partition had specific guidelines that defined borders and the administration of 
the land with the help of the UN.  The Zionist leadership was in favor of partition due to its 
inherent legitimation of the Jewish state in the region.  International legal precedents would 
allow a Jewish state to take root in Palestine and the issues of immigration and population 
control brought up in the 1939 White Paper could be addressed at a later date.  It is also clear, 
particularly given the actions of the next several months and the words of Ben-Gurion, that the 
Zionist leadership intended expansion beyond the partition borders from the beginning.  The idea 
for the Zionists to create a state without defined boundaries in their declaration of independence 
was crucial since Israel could expand its borders beyond the 1947 partition lines through force of 
arms.  Ben-Gurion argued that if “our strength proves sufficient” the Zionists could conquer a 
larger territory than provided through UN partition.137  The Palestinians on the ground did not 
accept partition in any way.  The legitimation of the Jewish state that made the Jews accept 
partition caused the Palestinians to revolt once again.   
The Arab-Israeli conflict immediately catapulted into a civil war.  The first stage of the 
1948 war is best viewed as a civil war between the Zionists and Arabs because the Mandatory 
power, the British, stayed out of the fight.  Still, the end of the Mandate was approaching and 
British personnel were already moving out of the region.  The first conflicts involved small-scale 
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fighting along with terrorist and counterterrorist activities.  Sporadic clashes of a guerilla nature 
seemed to work to the Palestinians’ advantage in the hill country, on cross-territorial roads and in 
settlements and the fighting began with Arab initiative.  At this time, the Haganah was on the 
“strategic defensive.”138  This status quo lasted until mid-March, when a different dynamic began 
to take hold.139  Throughout the civil war, the British military was reluctant to intervene.  At 
times, however, the British did engage in fighting regardless of their military’s guidelines 
explicitly requiring that all combat actions be defensive in nature.140  Some of their actions were 
in the aid of Arab forces against the Jews, which typically prompted retaliatory attacks from the 
more radical elements of the Zionist forces, Irgun and Lehi.141  Such retaliations included a Lehi 
response following a British roundup of Haganah soldiers said to have been “butchered” on 28 
February, 1948.142  Their response was to blow up a train carrying British troops, which killed 
twenty-eight while wounding several dozen others.143  All of the fighting during the early part of 
the civil war through April had allowed the Arabs to make extraordinary advances.   At the same 
time, the Yishuv was being crippled by supply shortages, including food.   
The Yishuv not only experienced these military and supply setbacks, but suffered from 
the increasing caution of the international community.  It was becoming clear that the Zionist 
cause was waning leading into the second stage of the civil war.144  Some questioning of the 
Partition Plan by the international community, including the United States, began to concern the 
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Zionists.145  This wavering of faith troubled the Zionists since partition had been their 
international legitimation up to this point and the Zionist leadership saw it as the key to the 
official creation of the Jewish state.  The Zionist leadership began putting pressure on the United 
States through lobbying to ensure that partition be maintained.   
An article in the Palestine Post on 19 April by Sumner Welles, former U.S. Under-
Secretary of State, titled “War in Trusteeship,” explained that a disastrous situation was 
emerging in which international abandonment of the UN Partition Plan would have grave 
consequences.  By this time, American diplomatic leaders were considering a plan of 
international trusteeship over the soon to be abandoned British Mandate in Palestine.  In Welles’ 
article, he made gloomy predictions about the U.S. withdrawal of support from partition, which 
could lead to a possible heating up of Cold War activities with the Soviets and the demise of the 
United Nations itself.  This article, written by an American official, made it clear that the time to 
become involved in military assistance in Palestine had come and gone and that the good faith in 
the U.S. was swiftly retreating.  The fighting had already begun in Palestine and the United 
Nations had only projected rhetoric and plans with little or no action.  The United States’ moral 
leadership throughout the world was called into question as Welles predicted that the Soviets 
would send troops if the U.S. were to do the same, which would “touch on the powder keg,” as 
Welles quoted from Secretary of State George Marshall.146  This inherently gave the readership 
in Palestine a negative view of the U.S. and the United Nations before the mediation process had 
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even begun.  Though trust in the mediation of Bernadotte was not doomed from the outset the 
population, as well as the Revisionists, were skeptical of international involvement.147   
A four-page article echoed Mr. Welles’ thoughts in the Palestine Post on 26 April titled 
“U.N. Failure Caused Jewish Offensive.”  The article offered insight into the Zionist feeling on 
the ground as the Jewish offensive intensified.  The article lacked an authorial by-line, but it was 
clearly written by someone who was in the region and who very much had an opinion.  The 
article was in response to an editorial called “The Jews Act” printed in the New York Herald 
Tribune a month earlier, “soon after the [U.S.] withdrawal from Partition” which discussed the 
failure of the UN and the natural reaction of the Jews to act on their own.148  The writer used 
words like “bankruptcy” to describe the American Palestine policy that “effectively tied the 
hands of the United Nations,” and caused the Jews to “take things into their own hands.”149  The 
author also pointed out that it was at that time the decision was made to form a provisional 
government at the end of the British Mandate, a mandate that failed to keep the peace.  If the UN 
reversed its stance on Partition, it “would try to do what Britain has been unable to do:  rule over 
and keep peace in strife-torn Palestine.”150  The main point of this article rested on two opinions 
of the writer, claiming both are true; the Jewish action is a “desperate measure,” and that “it was 
the only possible course remaining.”151  It was seen as a desperate measure by the writer, because 
though the Haganah is “undoubtedly well-organized,” it would be defending itself “as an island 
in an Arab sea.”152  This article shows the sentiment of the Jewish people in Palestine.  This was 
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a feeling of being surrounded by the neighboring Arab countries and greatly outnumbered, mixed 
with a little hubris, and the expectation of a possible Arab unification.  The opinion that violence 
was the only course remaining for the Jews stemmed from the feeling that the UN Palestine 
Commission had not taken any action.  If the General Assembly, as expected, rejected partition 
and “plumped for trusteeship,” the UN would be stuck in the same lot the British had been, with 
the outcome expected to be unsuccessful.  The writer also stated that the time for military action, 
or policing, by the UN had come and gone.  It was the writer’s opinion that this may have been 
an option at one time, but that “time has run short.”153   The UN would have to deal with both 
armed forces of Jews and Arabs and “impose a solution unwelcome to both sides.”154  “The 
Partition boundaries make no economic or military sense, and could only be maintained by 
agreement between Jew and Arab, or enforced by a strong army of the United Nations.”155  It is 
the writer’s opinion that neither of those outcomes was possible. 
Though the UN and the United States were just beginning to think that partition could not 
be implemented peacefully, the concept of violence as a political tool was too well ingrained in 
the new Revisionist’s design.  Recalling Jabotinsky, the colonized were expected to rebel and the 
“Iron Wall” needed to be established and maintained to achieve victory or the Zionist cause 
would be lost.  “Zionist colonization must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native 
population.”156  As far as the Revisionists were concerned, there never was a peaceful option in 
their strategy of taking control of Eretz Yisrael.  Through the middle of March, the acceptance of 
the Partition Plan had largely kept the Haganah at bay while the Arab Palestinians were the 
major aggressors.  The Yishuv had hoped “the disturbances would blow over and, in deference to 
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[British] sensibilities,” and their own lack of military might, they kept on the defensive.157  By 
the end of March, however, the time came to go on the offensive.  The organization of the militia 
and the arrival of Czech armament shipments gave the Haganah the necessary tools to turn the 
tide of the battle.   
Despite their anticolonial disposition directed at international intruders, the Revisionist 
paramilitaries fought against the Arabs as well as the British.  Alongside the Haganah they 
expelled thousands of Arabs controversially in what would later be dubbed by the Palestinians, 
“al-nakba,” the disaster.158  The expulsions began with the destruction of Arab towns that 
overlooked Jewish settlements or threatened lines of communication.159  These expulsions were 
part of a larger scheme called Plan Dalet (Plan D) that sought to remove Palestinians completely 
and clear the way for the Jewish state. 160  The main objective was to secure all of the areas that 
the Yishuv were to populate under the Partition Plan, as well as the roads between those regions.  
The possible intention to expand beyond the partition boundaries is also evidenced in the 
implementation of Plan D.  The plan was extended to areas of Jewish settlement outside of the 
partition boundaries, such as the West Bank and the Western Galilee.  The lasting effect of Plan 
D was the physical replacement of Arabs in the land with Jews, slowly encroaching on the 
sought after Jewish majority and the proverbial iron wall.  After the Arabs had been killed or 
fled, incoming Jews could move into vacated homes and even entire villages.  Those villages 
deemed too primitive or unwanted were simply destroyed to prevent Arab return entirely or to 
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reshape the land in the Zionist image.161  This concept of the spoils of war changing the identity 
of a land, as it pertained to architecture, is important in understanding the figurative iron wall 
that was erected between the two cultures.  Historian Robert Bevan explained this “Destruction 
of Memory” as crucial in almost every conflict in history, with the gained territory from victory 
being reshaped for the purposes of the victor and cultural hegemony.162   
There was never a “smoking gun” directive from Zionist leadership to implement Plan D, 
however.  The Haganah documentation from this period of the war contains no reference to the 
plan though it was ostensibly carried out in the field by Zionist commanders, whether they were 
aware of it or not.163  The implementation of Plan D included efforts by the Haganah, Irgun, and 
Lehi.  Ideologically, this plan was in conflict with the expressed views of Jabotinsky, who had 
stated previously that the native population could not be completely removed.  Once again, he 
believed that “there will always be two nations in Palestine,” which was acceptable as long as 
“the Jews become the majority,” a crucial endgame that was the basis for the iron wall to be 
effective.164  By this point, however, the transformed Revisionist party had taken on a completely 
new attitude toward the expansion of the Yishuv. 
During the civil war that lasted until the declaration of Israeli Independence in May, the 
Irgun and Lehi committed the worst atrocities of the conflict in the name of Plan D.  On April 9, 
a joint attack by the Irgun and Lehi routed the inhabitants of Deir Yassin, an Arab suburb of 
Jerusalem.  Deir Yassin had entered into a nonaggression pact with the Haganah by this point 
and the villagers had enjoyed relative peace.  When the Irgun and Lehi attacked, up to 300 
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Arabs, including men, women, and children, were allegedly “mutilated…and stuffed down 
wells.”165  Propaganda by the Irgun and Haganah used the incident to warn Arabs that future 
attacks of a similar nature would occur if the Palestinians did not flee.  Though many Palestinian 
refugees fled, Deir Yassin was not the end.  The massacre at Deir Yassin is but one of many such 
events both before and after though it is largely popularized as the defining event of al-nakba 
and the beginning of the Palestinian refugee crisis.166   
After the attack at Deir Yassin, Lehi’s propaganda shifted blame to the Haganah for a 
large proportion of those killed, saying that 170 of the 240 reported at the time were killed in an 
unrelated Haganah skirmish.167  To further extend the divide between the Revisionists and 
Zionist leadership, the Jewish Agency, which was head of the Zionist provisional government 
before Israeli independence, accepted the motion of Ben-Gurion to condemn the Deir Yassin 
massacre.168  This was essentially a condemnation of the illegal acts of the paramilitaries, and a 
disavowal of them as a whole.  He even sent an apology telegram to King Abdullah of 
Transjordan.  The Jewish cause lost some sympathy abroad.  The “terrorist acts of the Stern 
Gang in Palestine have alienated some sympathy for those who failed to realize that this is a tiny 
minority in a people struggling mightily to maintain discipline under conditions of desperate 
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provocation.”169  Zionist leadership in the Provisional Government needed to distance itself, at 
least publically, from those elements of the Revisionists that were in reality effectively working 
towards the same end.   
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CHAPTER 6:  WAR and BERNADOTTE 
Statements like those made by Ben-Gurion denouncing Revisionist violence, and thus 
assuaging the anger of the Arabs after Deir Yassin, disillusioned the Revisionist right to the acts 
of the government.  Lehi commander Nathan Friedman-Yellin later said that there were those 
who “suffered atrophy of the feeling for the Fatherland.”170  The damage of the brutal attacks at 
Deir Yassin and elsewhere was done, however, and the collective Zionist military forces were 
now on the offensive.  By the middle of May the Palestinian fighting cause had all but been 
extinguished.171  The change in the tide of the civil war had finally led to the decision by the 
surrounding Arab nations to take action and, following the declaration of Israeli independence on 
14 May, 1948, they invaded.  According to an interview with King Abdullah of Transjordan on 
11 May, “the possibility of averting war is in the hands of the Zionists.”172  He believed that the 
Arab invasion was for the good of the whole of Palestine and that they were “coming to Palestine 
to enforce peace against the Zionist terror bands.  War is not being declared.  Relieving Palestine 
from the grip of the Zionists is not war against the Jews.”173 
On 13 May, 1948, at his home in Stockholm, the head of the Swedish Red Cross, Count 
Bernadotte, received a telephone call.  He later recalled that he “laughed when [he] told [his] 
colleagues” about the call.  He had been offered a possible appointment as the “United Nations 
Mediator in the ugly-looking conflict between Jews and Arabs.”174  After he deliberated with his 
wife and posed some stipulations to the Secretary General of the UN Trygve Lie, he accepted 
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this post and began planning his mission.  One of his stipulations was that the Big Five of the 
Security Council—the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China—agree on 
him as a candidate.  On the following night of 14 May, members of the Zionist leadership met in 
Tel Aviv and voted unanimously to declare the independence of Israel without defined borders.  
Recognition by the United States came from President Harry S. Truman within minutes.  The 
U.S. “[recognized] the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new [State of 
Israel].”175  Shortly after, the Soviets followed suit and by morning Israel was officially 
recognized by the dominant powers.  On 19 May, Bernadotte received word from the Security 
Council that as Mediator, he was to seek peace and assist in the security and welfare of the 
Palestinian people.  The terms as outlined in the Security Council resolution of 14 May that 
appointed a United Nations Mediator were “to use his good offices with the local and community 
authorities in Palestine to: 
(i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being 
of the population of Palestine; 
(ii) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine; 
(iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.”176 
 
Mediation would also include work with the UN Truce Commission, though it was subsequently 
left to Bernadotte to work with a “fairly free hand” toward proposals for future lasting peace in 
the region.177   
Since Israel was by this point officially recognized by the dominant world powers and no 
longer under the dominion of the British Empire and the Arab nations attacked, the conflict 
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became a conventional war between states mediated by the United Nations.178  The war that took 
place during the summer months of 1948 was Bernadotte’s chance to garner support and bring 
peace to the region.  This was a period of great confusion; there was more than one truce, 
violations of ceasefires, and long term proposals that left all sides wanting.  Count Bernadotte’s 
appointment as the Mediator in this conflict began only a few days after the invasion with his 
committed acceptance of the task at hand.  With only three days to prepare for his journey, 
Bernadotte left for Paris on 25 May to meet with his staff.  This included Trygve Lie’s personal 
representative and Bernadotte’s chief advisor, the man who would eventually lead the peace 
effort, American Professor Dr. Ralph Bunche.  At a press conference in Paris, Bernadotte 
expressed his belief that there was “only a one percent chance of success.”179  He continued: 
You probably think I am a big fool for taking on this job with such a slight chance for 
success, but I regard the Palestine problem as a spark capable of setting off a mightier 
conflagration, and that being so I feel it my duty to take that chance, small though it may 
be.  If I fail, well, I am enough of a man to take on a job, even though it might be 
foredoomed to almost certain failure.180  
 
Bernadotte actually bemoaned the press attention that the Palestine issue was receiving since he 
believed he could be far more effective if given the chance to work with relative serenity and 
away from the public eye.181  In Paris, there was no shortage of advisors clamoring to bring the 
Mediator up to speed during his two day visit.  Bernadotte received advice from his new chief 
advisor as well as a surplus of briefings from various parties involved.  The British Chargé 
d’Affaires Ashley Clarke presented the British point of view with regards to peace as well as the 
                                                          
178 Morris, 1948, 180-183; Note: The Arab nations consisted of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, 
Egypt, and Iraq as well as elements from Yemen, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.  The event of the 
Arab states’ invasion excluded the native Palestinians already fighting within the territory. 
179 “Bernadotte to Go to Palestine Soon: Accepts Task as U.N. Mediator -- Sees Only 1% Chance 
of Success, Feels End Worth It,” New York Times, May 22, 1948, ProQuest (108205835). 
180 Ibid.  
181 Ibid. 
56 
 
British military personnel within the ranks of the Arab League.  The British position, as outlined 
by Clarke, leaves little to the imagination in how the Zionists could see them as an enemy.  “He 
emphasized that the British Government was not prepared for the time being to take any steps 
against the Arabs.  In fact, he added, [they] were still continuing to supply arms to the Arabs, and 
the British officers who had joined the Arab forces as instructors were also taking an active part 
in the war.”182  He also met with the Vice President of The Jewish Agency, Dr. Nahum 
Goldman, who gave the Israeli Provisional Government’s viewpoint and declared that further 
dealings would be with only the Provisional Government with no outside interference from the 
Jewish Agency or other Zionist groups.  After these brief introductions as to what he would face, 
Bernadotte left Paris for Cairo on the first leg of his mission.183  Since Bernadotte felt so strongly 
about this mission and the chances of failure, he felt he needed to meet with the people that could 
aid him in his attempts in securing peace and provide him with the knowledge he required to 
succeed.  The Swedish Representative to the UN advised him to take a trip to Lake Success, New 
York, then the UN Headquarters, to be briefed on the question of Palestine. Bernadotte’s briefing 
instead began in Cairo as he deemed it “quite wrong that anyone who had been appointed 
Mediator in a conflict in the Near East…should make it his first business to go west to acquire 
information.”184   
From Paris to Cairo, by way of Rome and Athens, the Mediator made it his intention to 
sit down with what was seen as the most moderate Arab leadership in the region.  Bernadotte had 
many visitations during his stay in Cairo between 28 and 30 May.  First was Sir Hugh Dow, the 
British representative in Jerusalem who was well versed in the partitioning of populations as he 
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had served in the British Civil Service in India years before.  Sir Hugh admittedly saw this as a 
different situation, however, given the presence of outside intervention, namely the Arab 
invasion and United Nations involvement.  Bernadotte then met with several of the top Arab 
leaders in Cairo including the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Mohammed Khachaba Pasha, 
Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha, and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha.185  
Bernadotte sought an audience with Arab leadership at the outset of his trip because “it was the 
Arabs…who were adopting the offensive, and it was…with them that [he] ought to seek contact 
first in any question of a truce or cease-fire.”186  Bernadotte’s decision offended the Zionists, 
though in “a region where symbols often outweigh reality, the wrong signal sent by his first stop 
eluded [him].”187   
During these talks, Egypt offered to accept a truce in the event that Jewish immigration to 
Palestine ceased.  The prime minister accepted that Jews were already there and that they could 
not and should not be expelled.  However, he could not abide a Jewish state created by terrorism 
and force of arms, and hoped that the Mediator did not “consider himself bound by the terms of 
the partition decision taken by the General Assembly last 29th November.”188  This sentiment 
was shared by Azzam Pasha.  Both made some suggestions to the Mediator including a unitary 
state with some Jewish autonomy.  Azzam Pasha even suggested the possibility of a sort of 
“Vatican State” that could be a mouthpiece for Jewish interests abroad with ambassadors in 
various countries.189  The Mediator’s meeting with Azzam Pasha, a man he later praised as 
interesting, had then dealt with a possible truce.  Azzam Pasha felt that the Jews “had been 
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preparing for war for the past ten years.”190  The Arab ability to acquire weapons was meager 
compared to the new state of Israel.  Arabs had “no friends amongst the influential states.”  He 
felt that Arabs might lose ground if a truce were to be instituted.191  The Mediator attempted to 
put his mind at ease.  His mission was to supervise the truce and one of the conditions was to 
maintain battle lines with no military gain or importation of war material, as well as the 
curtailing of Jewish immigration.   
While in Cairo, terms of a truce were sent by both the British and Soviets to the UN and 
then officially drafted as a UN Resolution on 29 May.192  Since he was not involved in these 
truce proposals, he saw this as an initiative which was detrimental to his mission, one with an 
incredibly short timetable.  Bernadotte thought it imperative to get a clearer understanding of the 
situation swiftly.  The Mediator needed to meet with the leadership of the belligerent forces.  His 
mission was to compel them to accept the truce proposal of 29 May that would create a ceasefire 
and allow him to work on a long term peace proposal.  He had to act quickly and sit with all 
parties involved.  It was imperative to convince them to accept the truce agreements before they 
could reject them.  An Arab or a Jewish official rejection would be impossible to overcome in 
the future.  With the possibility of a controversial truce approaching, he left Cairo for Tel Aviv 
on 31 May and met with Foreign Minister Shertok and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who was 
also the acting defense minister at the time.  The official Israeli position was clarified in detail 
for the mediator.  The Israeli PM expressed his disappointment at the fact that the Israeli 
government had by this point accepted two truce proposals while the Arabs had not been 
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sanctioned in any way for their rejections.193  Bernadotte made every effort to ease the concern 
of Ben-Gurion, but at this point his acceptance of truce was not explicit.  The prime minister 
shared the sentiment relayed to Bernadotte by the Arab leadership that the other side would gain 
an advantage if any truce were to be implemented.194  Bernadotte then left for Amman, the 
capital of Transjordan, on the 1 June to speak with Arab leadership there.  This included the 
British General Glubb Pasha the Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Legion as well as Foreign 
Minister Fawzi El Molki Pasha of Transjordan.  These meetings were followed by a short talk 
with King Abdullah.  The Mediator once again explained his position and the coming truce.  This 
included his feeling that a specific date and time needed to be made explicit for the beginning of 
the cessation of fighting.  It was also his intention to make it clear to the Security Council that 
he, the Mediator, should be the one to set such a timeline.  Bernadotte’s impression was that the 
foreign minister was in favor of a truce at that point and his conversation with King Abdullah 
went equally as well.195  A representative of the American Consul-General for Jerusalem then 
spoke to Bernadotte on the situation in that most contested city.  Jerusalem, he explained, was in 
utter confusion.  The discipline of the Arab forces was commendable but the Israelis were 
continuing attacks on areas agreed upon as off limits.  He was uncertain even of whom their 
commanding officers were.196   
After all of Bernadotte’s meetings on the situation in Palestine, he flew back to Cairo to 
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await the Security Council’s word on the acceptance of the truce proposal as well as his 
suggestion that he determine the beginning of cessation of hostilities.  At first, the acceptance of 
the truce came with conditions by both Israeli and Arab leaders.  In Bernadotte’s opinion, “this 
did not therefore constitute any acceptance of the truce terms.”197  Adding to the confusion in 
Jerusalem, word of a preliminary acceptance of the truce had reached the Israeli forces with 
orders to cease fighting.  The Arab forces had received no such word and thus continued their 
attacks, which inflamed the situation.198  Finally, the Security Council reported to Bernadotte of 
the unconditional acceptance of the truce by both sides.199  The Security Council’s 
communication also included an agreement that Bernadotte be the one to determine the 
beginning of the truce, together with the suggestion that it be as soon as possible so as to avoid 
further complications.200  The truce began on 11 June 1948 and marked the beginning of the 
Mediator’s official mission in Palestine.  The terms of the truce were “general in their language,” 
but were intended to “bring about a cessation of hostilities… without prejudice.”201  Included in 
the truce was a prohibition of “fighting personnel… introduced into… the Arab States or… 
Palestine” as well as a prohibition on troop movement and shipments of “war materials” from 
“one interested country to another.”202  The rest of the truce outlined the discretion of the 
Mediator in the matter of what constituted a violation of the truce.   
In the final report by Bernadotte in September, he explained the truce observation’s 
organizational shortcomings during the ceasefire that lasted from 11 June to 9 July.  This 
                                                          
197 Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, 45. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid., 46-47. 
200 Ibid. 
201 United Nations, Security Council, Report dated 16 September 1948 by the United Nations 
Mediator on the observation of the Truce in Palestine During the Period from 11 June to 9 July 
1948, S/1025 (5 October, 1948), available from undocs.org/S/1025. 
202 Ibid., 3. 
61 
 
particularly included the lack of manpower at his disposal.203  Until two days before the truce 
began it was uncertain even if a truce was to occur.  There were several nations at war, including 
the native Arab Palestinians, and varying battle lines to supervise and leaders to be kept 
informed.  Despite having American, French, Belgian, and other nations' officers at his disposal, 
there simply was not enough help.  The entire organization of observation had been created from 
scratch and communication became one of the first issues faced by the collaborating nations’ 
observers.  At the outset of the truce, the exact battle lines in the contested city of Jerusalem were 
a serious issue.  Arab and Israeli forces faced off “across lines that were so close in places that 
they almost touched” and “in some places, opposing forces held opposite sides of the same 
street.”204  This made the observation of the truce in Jerusalem particularly hard to maintain.   
The Mediator also pointed out in his report that there were several “major problems” and 
“violations reported to the Security Council.”205  During the period of the truce, there were 
collectively over two hundred reported breaches of the ceasefire.  These included instances of 
“sniping,” and military engagement.206  Another major problem during the observation of the 
truce was the inclusion of irregulars.  They “considered themselves as not bound by the ceasefire 
or truce.”207  The Arab Liberation Army was one example of irregular fighters, but the biggest 
violators among irregulars were “on the Jewish side [and] consisted… of the [Irgun] and the 
Stern Group.”208  Lehi’s forces in Jerusalem were later accounted at around 400 “which included 
reinforcements from Tel Aviv.”209  Lehi’s actions, like the massacres at Deir Yassin and Tantura, 
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had begun dictating terms to the Haganah, according to a military prosecutor who cross 
examined Friedman-Yellin after the murder of Bernadotte.  He asked “by what right did 150 or 
even 200 men set conditions to a force of 5,000 or 6,000 of the Haganah.”  To that the Lehi 
commander replied, “by the right of past experience, conscience, and acts of bravery.”210  
Though Arab governments took no responsibility for the actions of Arab irregulars, the Israeli 
government claimed responsibility for every Jewish fighter within the regions occupied by its 
military.211   
That responsibility was taken when the Revisionist paramilitary group Irgun was 
dismantled shortly after an event commonly referred to as the “Altalena Incident.”  Early in June, 
the Israeli government had come to an agreement with the Irgun which assimilated that group 
into the IDF, though the Irgun in Jerusalem remained independent.  At this point Jerusalem was 
officially outside of the Israeli state and thus out of their jurisdiction.  On 19-20 June, during the 
first truce, a kind of rebellion occurred when an Irgun ship from France, the Altalena, arrived off 
the coast of Israel.  The ship was carrying immigrants, soldiers and weapons and the Irgun 
demanded its contents for their own IDF units.212  The government deemed the arrival of the ship 
a “blatant breach of national law, of the agreement with the [Irgun] and of the government’s 
international commitments.”213  The Irgun attempted to take the ship by force and engaged in 
firefights with the IDF to secure the passengers and weapons.  On 21 June, after the IDF had won 
the battle, the ship sailed for Tel Aviv and government forces fired artillery at the Altalena.  The 
ship sank right in the harbor.  The IDF also stormed the Irgun headquarters in Tel Aviv and it 
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was officially disbanded everywhere except Jerusalem.214   
This affair is a symbolic manifestation of the split between the internationally recognized 
Zionist Provisional Government and the Revisionists that had become militarized up to this 
point.  The Irgun leader Menachem Begin even claimed after the incident that “he could in a 
moment have killed the Prime Minister, had he wished to do so.”215  The relationship between 
the Irgun and Lehi at this point took on another dimension as well.  Leading up to the Altalena 
incident, Irgun and Lehi leaders had already been growing closer due to Lehi’s “appreciation of 
the [Irgun’s] ideological pragmatism.”216  The two groups now saw Ben-Gurion’s actions in the 
Altalena incident as yet another example of his pandering to the Western bloc and the United 
Nations, a concept abhorrent to their shared ideological preferences.  Lehi in particular drew a 
connection between the Altalena incident and the Bernadotte mission.  “Both demonstrated the 
extent to which the Hebrew people were on the verge of renewed subservience to foreign 
rule.”217  What the UN Mediator did next seemingly proved Lehi correct.   
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CHAPTER 7:  THE BERNADOTTE PLAN 
On 28 June, Bernadotte presented to the Security Council and the other parties involved 
his first proposal for a long term peace agreement, known as “The Bernadotte Plan.”  He had 
“intentionally made [his] proposals very vague in the hope that it might be easier in that way to 
induce the parties to continue negotiations on the basis of the draft.”218  He at first acknowledged 
his mission in this regard and outlined the “calmer atmosphere, more favourable to the task of 
mediation” that was made possible by the truce.219  Talks with representatives of both sides 
during this period gave Bernadotte the information he was looking for, according to this report, 
which included the issues with which the opposing parties were most concerned.  According to 
his report they related to “partition, the establishment of a Jewish State, and Jewish 
immigration.”220  Bernadotte saw it as his mission to offer suggestions that might be countered to 
continue discussions, rather than to enforce decisions made on his behalf.  His suggestions 
outlined an economic union in Palestine consisting of two members, one Arab and one Jewish, 
with a central council and boundaries to be outlined by the two members in further 
negotiations.221  Immigration was “within the competence of each member” with flexibility on 
future establishment of immigration policies determined by the council.222  Religious rights and 
holy places were also to be guaranteed by the union as well as the right of return for all 
Palestinians displaced due to the ongoing conflict.  The Bernadotte Plan finished with an annex 
that covered territorial matters.  These territorial suggestions specifically outlined regions to be 
allotted to the Jewish community and those to be part of Arab territory.  The most troubling 
                                                          
218 Folke Bernadotte, Instead of Arms, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949), 199. 
219 UNSC, Text of Suggestions Presented by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the 
Two Parties on 28 June, 1948, S/863 (8 July 1948). 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
65 
 
territorial assignments for Zionists were the inclusion of Jerusalem in Arab territory, as well as 
the cities of Lydda and Haifa which were to be established as a free airport and free water port, 
respectively.223  The suggestions made by the Mediator reflected changes from the Partition Plan 
that would have made Palestine an Arab majority nation with the bulk of the geographical 
territory. 
Bernadotte received word that neither side wanted “to consider [his] proposals as a basis 
for continued discussions,” though they were hopeful he would continue his efforts.224  The end 
of the truce on 9 July was imminent, and the Mediator continued his efforts by attempting to 
prolong the truce already in place and to completely demilitarize Jerusalem.225  He contacted the 
Security Council via cablegram on 5 July to appeal for a prolongation of the truce.  He felt it was 
time that “the parties to the truce must answer the question whether, in the absence of agreement 
on the procedure and substance of mediation, they will again resort to armed conflict.”226  He 
believed that the decision to continue hostilities would be “viewed by the world with the utmost 
gravity.”227  He called on the United Nations to “urgently appeal to the interested parties” to 
prolong the truce for a period of time to be determined in consultation with him.228  His 
proposals to prolong the truce were tentatively “accepted by the Jews but not by the Arabs,” a 
generalization of these groups that in itself was problematic considering the divisions within 
both.229   
On the matter of the truce, the mainstream Zionist Labor Party in charge of the 
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government did not speak for the Revisionists who were incensed by the proposed plan.  The 
Revisionists believed that the Bernadotte Plan proved that the Mediator was an enemy to their 
vision of a complete Jewish territory.  They also believed that the Zionist leadership was too 
reliant on the “Anglo-Saxon bloc” and was pandering to the Western nations.  These radical 
Revisionists leaned politically more toward an alliance with the Soviets with whom they had 
shared political interests in the region.  Lehi believed that true independence would never exist 
until they “freed themselves from the yolk of the West and aligned with the East.”230  They fell 
right into the Cold War context of the time within a true East vs. West political atmosphere.  
USSR Representative to the United Nations Andrei Gromyko unsurprisingly also took issue with 
Bernadotte’s suggestions.   
In the 331st meeting of the Security Council on 7 July, the Soviet representative accused 
Bernadotte of taking power into his own hands and ignoring the Partition Plan of November 
1947.231  He also claimed that the UN had not granted any power to the Mediator to reconsider 
the previous decisions of the General Assembly, a statement that was certainly untrue.  His point 
was to accuse the Mediator of collusion with other interested parties, referring to “those hiding 
behind his back, who are putting forward various kinds of unacceptable schemes” and “fanning 
the flames.”232  While the Soviets saw Bernadotte as colluding with the West, to the Revisionists 
he had become the very face of Western imperialism.  Not surprisingly, it was the Arab 
representatives on the Security Council that came to the Mediator’s defense.  They believed that 
his proposals benefitted the Arabs on the issue of territory.  But despite the arguments of the 
United Nations representatives half-way around the world, the fact on the ground was that the 
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truce was only two days away from ending and there was no extension in place. 
The end of the first truce was fraught with “tension and nervousness” as breaches of the 
ceasefire became more frequent.233  The truce personnel, upon learning that the truce was not to 
be renewed by the end of the ceasefire, were evacuated to Haifa and they actually left Palestine 
by plane on 8 July.  Toward the end of the truce, Bernadotte’s estimation was that no one was 
willing to reignite the war.  He mentioned in his autobiography a secret meeting with King 
Abdullah that confirms that, at least on the Arab side, it was believed that “neither party was 
inclined to start the war anew.”  Without a prolongation of the truce, however, Egyptian forces 
attacked a day before the truce expired and the IDF began their offensive on all battlefronts in a 
calculated response.234  The truce observers had acted gallantly according to Bernadotte’s report 
to the Security Council.  A few had even been killed or wounded.235  Their sacrifices had not 
been in vain.  Despite several complaints and violations of the truce it was considered a success.  
“Much bloodshed and destruction [had] been avoided and many lives spared.”236  Bernadotte’s 
assessment of that effort was that “no substantial military advantage was gained by either side” 
and “on the whole, the truce worked well.”237  Effective as it was, the truce expired on 9 July and 
fighting resumed.   
As hostilities officially reignited, the newly empowered and “belligerent” Israeli force 
began to reconquer much of the territory lost to the initial pan-Arab invasion.238  Ben-Gurion 
thought it imperative to continue the fight to show Jewish strength and not allow the Arabs to 
feel that they had been bailed out by the UN.  He exclaimed at a cabinet meeting 11 July, “the 
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war must end with such a bombing of Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo, that they will no longer have 
a desire to fight us, and will make peace with us.”239  Ben-Gurion felt that an end to the war 
through diplomatic means would give the Arabs the impression that Israel was weak.  At the 
beginning of renewed hostilities, Jerusalem was still contested but the IDF had made 
extraordinary strides in bolstering its military capabilities.  This was in large part due to the 
commando forces of Lehi, who had successfully completed a movement around Jerusalem and 
had “effected an amicable conjunction of forces” between themselves and the IDF.240  Their new 
offensive strategy was to secure all of Palestine.  Lehi had hardened its position by this point and 
wanted to expel all of the Arabs, not just a majority.  They had become self-confident in light of 
their victories and their control of territory.  Their situation was “not at all as it was in 1938… 
[they possessed] strength and [were] able to create facts.”241  Israel referred to the fighting 
immediately following the truce as “the Ten Days.”  It lasted to 18 July and was filled with many 
short but bloody skirmishes.242  The Security Council was forced to act swiftly.  It was once 
again the responsibility of the Mediator and the Security Council to negotiate a new truce and a 
long term peace agreement before the Israelis could completely dominate the war.  During “the 
Ten Days,” Israeli advances forced the UN on 15 July to propose a new truce to begin in no more 
than three days.243   
The continuation of fighting after the first truce and the refusal by both belligerent parties 
to prolong the ceasefire caused the United Nations to rethink its position in the conflict.  The 
proposal for a second truce on 15 July was an example of the Security Council finally showing 
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some willingness to use the powers granted in the UN Charter.  They determined that the 
continuation of hostilities represented a “threat to the peace” as defined in Article 39 of that 
Charter.244  According to Article 39, the Security Council retains the right to “determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and… decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”245  The following three articles of the Charter allowed for the 
determination of action if this breach of the peace was agreed upon.  Pursuant to Article 40, this 
recommendation for a ceasefire represented a “call upon the parties to comply with… 
provisional measures.”246  Article 41, however, allowed the United Nations to apply certain non-
military sanctions and the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations…and other 
means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.”247  For the first time, the 
United Nations considered flexing its power as outlined in their charter.  
As the truce proposal suggested, if in the event the belligerent parties were undeterred by 
these sanctions, Article 42 stated that the Security Council could call on its members to intervene 
directly “by air, sea or land forces.”248  This was the first time that the United Nations had 
stepped out of the mediation role in the conflict and threatened forceful intervention.  In fact, the 
resolution for a second truce actually called upon “all governments and authorities concerned” to 
cooperate with the Mediator under the auspices of the original truce agreement of 29 May as if it 
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had never ended.249  The main difference in this truce was the situation in the city of Jerusalem.  
The Security Council now demanded a ceasefire in the city no later than twenty four hours from 
the adoption of the resolution and protection of the holy places.250  The remainder of the truce 
was to take effect no later than three days after the adoption of the resolution and last 
indefinitely, and it did in fact begin three days later and into the fall.   
The belligerents may have, for once, felt the power of the United Nations and its member 
states.  As Ben-Gurion said that Israel was not prepared to allow UN intervention to secure the 
Jewish state through a ceasefire, he surely saw a military intervention as even more dangerous.  
Lehi saw it as a “purely imperialist device” which “could only lead to economic as well as 
military disaster.”251  To Lehi, Israel was no longer a struggling polity looking for international 
legitimation.  They were a fierce fighting force with military superiority on the verge of total 
victory and a Jewish majority in Palestine.  Israel Eldad of Lehi took a maximalist position when 
he said that “the path of Hebrew liberation will be that of liberation throughout the world: the 
path of blood.  A conquered land is holier than one bought for money.”252  Despite the confident 
opposition of the Revisionist paramilitary, however, the second truce took effect on 18 July and 
lasted until the middle of October.  The UN threat was serious and the Zionist leadership 
acquiesced.  The Arabs too accepted the truce conditions.  Their beleaguered forces were more 
concerned with retaining the territories gained before the first truce and not lost since.  This truce 
opened a new door for Bernadotte to work on his second proposal for a long term peace. 
 The second truce, however, began without anybody to enforce it and a frustrated 
Bernadotte attempted to return to at least the moderate organization he had previously enjoyed 
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during the first truce.  At the end of the first truce all of his observers and security police had left 
the country with the expectation of renewed fighting.  With only one officer by his side and a 
minimal staff, Bernadotte petitioned the Security Council to send help.  Indeed he was frustrated 
by the “armchair politicians, be they never so highly qualified,” that made “theoretical decisions 
of the very greatest importance without first finding out whether it is possible to carry them out 
in practice.”253  He did eventually receive new observers from various nations and they were 
“immediately dispatched to their various posts.”254  Bernadotte’s mission continued, therefore, 
and he met with various leaders over the duration of the truce.  On 24 July, he flew to Beirut to 
meet with members of the Arab League, including a “tired and disillusioned” Azzam Pasha.255  
Bernadotte explained the Arabs’ options at this critical juncture.  On one hand, they could have 
resumed the war in an effort to prevent the Jewish state from existing alongside them, in fact 
their original goal.  The risks that accompanied resuming hostilities, however, were clear and 
included the detriment of international opinion and the development of an increasingly 
dangerous situation regarding a stronger Israeli fighting force.   On the other hand, they could 
have allowed the new truce to “drag on for months and years,” though Bernadotte felt this too 
would only hurt the Arabs.256  His third suggested option, what he felt to be the best decision, 
was to “recognize an independent Jewish state as soon as possible.”257  They had to make a 
decision immediately.  Bernadotte thought that Azzam Pasha “realizes deep down that the Arab 
world cannot any longer hope for a Palestine in which there will not be an independent Jewish 
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State.”258  This observation, written at the end of the summer and reflecting on the meeting of 24 
July, illustrates perfectly how embedded the state of Israel had become in the region, politically 
and more importantly with physical presence, through the efforts of its forces including the 
Revisionist paramilitaries.   
Bernadotte continued on to Tel Aviv to speak with the Provisional Jewish government in 
the new state of Israel.  He had been told by an unnamed source that the government’s 
“arrogance had increased during the ten days’ fighting.”259  He attributed this to their victories 
and to the fact that the Arab Legion had pulled out of Lydda and Ramleh due to the Israeli 
importation of arms and fighting personnel connected, in part, to the Altalena incident.  This 
arrogance was seen in “high-flown language” of the Israeli press.  There were even bold 
statements that the government would be able to negotiate with the Arabs directly, without need 
of a foreign mediator.260  Bernadotte rejected this concept outright.  If for no other reason, aside 
from finding peace or keeping the UN involved in the conflict in a direct way, the Mediator had 
become very passionate about one particular issue with which his next tour of the region was 
intended to discuss.  He needed to make sure that the issue of the Palestinian refugees, which had 
developed into a crisis, could be solved at the earliest possible time.  He believed that only he 
could make this happen.  
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CHAPTER 8:  “ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES” 
 Harkening back to the original Iron Wall Doctrine, Zionists understood that the 
Palestinians were not willingly going to give up their homes for a Jewish homeland.  Jabotinsky 
knew this as he wrote a section in “The Iron Wall” entitled “Arabs Not Fools.”261  He wrote that 
the Zionists “may tell them whatever we like about the innocence of our aims, watering them 
down and sweetening them with honeyed words to make them palatable, but they know what we 
want, as well as we know what they do not want.”262  This again was the basis of perpetual war.  
However, the concept that the Arabs could not be expelled was one that not only his successors 
would abandon, but the Labor leadership as well.  His idea was to create the iron wall within the 
new Jewish state, should it ever exist, while naively maintaining some humanitarian equality for 
Palestinian Arabs.  But by 1948, that concept was not only passé, it had been rejected outright.  
The mainstream Zionist leadership had adopted not only the idea of ‘transfer,’ a soft way of 
saying Palestinian expulsion, but a forcible removal of all Arabs from the lands of a future 
Jewish state.  A leadership that included Ben-Gurion, Weizmann and Shertok, “anticipated the 
‘clearing of the land’ in 1948.”263  Ben-Gurion echoed Jabotinsky’s belief that the Palestinians 
would not go willingly.  In a letter to his son as early as October 1937, he said, “we must expel 
Arabs and take their places…and, if we have to use force…to guarantee our own right to settle in 
those places—then we have force at our disposal.”264  What the leadership and the Revisionists 
did not take into account, however, was Jabotinsky’s original understanding that the removal of 
the Arabs was simply impossible.  Thus began a new dimension in 1948 of the unending war 
between Arabs and Jews.  
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 The ‘transfer’ of Arabs out of Jewish lands began with the fighting in December 1947.  It 
reached a boiling point just before the conventional war broke out and really began with Plan 
Dalet and the Deir Yassin incident on 9 April 1948.  Even Jews were intimidated into leaving 
their homes in the early fighting, though it was the Arabs who experienced the more mass 
exodus throughout the conflict.  According to a Palestinian teacher in Jerusalem, the “Jews 
launched a heavy attack” described as being “unlike anything heard in previous wars.”265  He 
continued, “no wonder this situation has made residents consider moving to another 
neighbourhood or town.”266  This was described in a 30 March entry of his diary, just before the 
attack on Deir Yassin, just outside of the holy city.  In the months that followed, this sentiment 
was experienced all over historic Palestine, from Galilee to the Negev.  Many Palestinians’ 
villages were destroyed.  They were “mortared, shelled and, occasionally, bombed from the air,” 
but due to expenses, some units of the Haganah, later the IDF, destroyed Arab homes through 
looting or intentional destruction with the use of hand tools and bulldozers, even explosives 
placed by hand.267  As historian Benny Morris has noted, this destruction of dwellings, individual 
homes or even whole villages, could be traced to the retaliatory practices of the Haganah and the 
British during the Arab uprising in the late 1930s.  “Destroying the house of a terrorist or his 
accomplice was regarded as just punishment and as a deterrent.”268  This is a practice that has 
continued to the present day. 
Ben-Gurion had taken notice of the destruction in Jerusalem as early as February 1948 
and prophetically expressed his feelings to a Labor Party meeting.  He hoped,  
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What had happened in Jerusalem…could well happen in great parts of the country—if we 
[the Yishuv] hold on…And if we hold on, it is very possible that in the coming six or 
eight or ten months of the war there will take place great changes…and not all of them to 
our detriment.  Certainly there will be great changes in the composition of the population 
of the country.269 
 
As predicted, the resurgence of hostilities during the “Ten Days” after the first truce had ended 
increased the exodus of refugees, mostly to the north-eastern and far southern edges of Palestine.  
Grudgingly, Ben-Gurion had actually issued a directive to leave the Arab civilians caught in the 
fighting alone, and to leave their villages and dwellings intact.  This politically motivated 
directive issued out of concerns over Ben-Gurion’s power would ultimately be entangled with 
contradictions that continued Arab expulsion during the inter-truce period.270  At this time he had 
been occupied as both Prime Minister and Defense Minister.  Though reasons for the continued 
expulsion varied, it continued almost unabated and helped aid in the Zionist war effort.  A report 
from Palmach, an Israeli special-forces unit that formerly worked with the Haganah, described 
the perceived advantages of the refugee exodus from Lydda and Ramleh.  Besides removing a 
future threat, it had “clogged the routes of advance of the [Arab] Legion” as well as hampering 
the Arab states economically with “another 45,000 souls…Moreover, the phenomenon of the 
flight of tens of thousands will no doubt [create] demoralization in every Arab area [the 
refugees] reach…This victory will yet have great effect on other sectors.”271  The Palestinians 
were fleeing in droves and what material possessions left behind were gladly exculpated of Arab 
ownership and either destroyed or placed in the hands of Zionists.  
Destruction of Arab property likely began with the retaliatory nature of the Haganah 
during the Arab Revolt, which created a culture of destruction.  Although in the context of this 
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war, these actions were also tactically sound and an effective method of extracting the spoils of 
war for the Jewish state.  During the revolt, “destroying the house of a terrorist or his accomplice 
was regarded as just punishment and as a deterrent.”272  During the war, however, about 350 
villages were “depopulated” and the majority of these were left “either completely or partly in 
ruins and uninhabitable.”273  Those that were not completely annihilated were taken by the new 
Jewish settlers, thus ensuring that the population map would remain changed and that there 
would be no return of the Palestinians that fled.  This was important for not only logistical 
reasons, but also for a solidification of hegemonic identity.  Robert Bevan, in his work describing 
the destruction of memory and the critical nature of manufacturing cultural hegemony in post-
conflict zones, explained that the victor of such conflicts intends to rewrite the historical 
narrative of physical space.  “This is the active and often systematic destruction of particular 
building types or architectural traditions…where the erasure of the memories, history and 
identity attached to architecture and place—enforced forgetting—is the goal itself.  These 
buildings are attacked not because they are in the path of a military objective: to their destroyers 
they are the objective.”274  Once the land was physically altered and reconstituted as Zionist 
territory, there was nowhere for the Palestinians to return and no contested nature of those former 
villages.  The displaced Arabs themselves became a primary concern of the UN Mediator who 
had begun seeing a crisis developing that needed to be addressed.  The Jewish leadership, 
however, were unsure even if they were willing to continue discussions with the peacemaker in 
light of their recent successes.  
On 26 July, after the second truce had begun, Bernadotte met again with Israeli Foreign 
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Minister Shertok in Tel Aviv.  He opened discussions “by asking for a definite statement as to 
whether the Jewish government wished to continue cooperation with [him] or not.”275  
Bernadotte’s own account of this period became more and more frustrated and strained.  The 
situation was wearing on him and the arrogance of the Israelis was a definite annoyance.  
Shertok suggested a mediated round table meeting between the Jewish and Arab leadership.  He 
thought it possible that their discussions could continue without the Mediator’s involvement.  
Bernadotte’s account contained no response to this suggestion, but he was clearly irritated at the 
proposal.  He instead shifted to what he wanted to discuss the most, the issue of the Palestinian 
refugees.  
It is important to note here that Bernadotte had dealt only with the Labor movement, 
which was in charge of Israel and helmed by Ben-Gurion.  The Mediator had no direct dealings 
with the Revisionists, who were outside of the law, with the exception of those Irgun elements 
that had been absorbed by the IDF after the Altalena incident.  The Labor movement, the 
internationally recognized leadership of the Jewish state, believed in operating within the law 
and insuring international legitimacy by a proper conduct of war.  Plan Dalet aside, at least on 
paper the IDF did exactly that.  The Revisionists, however, were able to operate outside of the 
law to implement the dispersal of the Palestinians.  Ben-Gurion and his colleagues could 
denounce their actions and save political face.  With the advent of war, the Iron Wall was being 
erected swiftly by both sides of the Zionist coin at the expense of the Arabs while global 
legitimacy was preserved.  What to do after the war, however, was of great concern to the 
Mediator while he dealt with the leadership of the new state.  
In the meeting between the UN Mediator and the Israeli Foreign Minister, Bernadotte 
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questioned Shertok on the eligibility of return for the displaced Palestinians to their homes in 
Palestine, a concept later referred to as repatriation or ‘the right of return.’  Shertok replied in the 
negative.  “The Jewish Government could under present conditions in no circumstances permit 
the return of Arabs who had fled or been driven from their homes during the war.”276  Bernadotte 
saw this statement as a clear indication that the Israeli government had no intentions of returning 
to the conditions provided for it under the Partition Plan of November 1947.  The return of Arabs 
would relegate the Jews to a perpetual minority population.  Bernadotte was shocked at the idea 
that the Jews could politicize this situation and ignore “the humanitarian side of the matter.”277  
He was clearly unaware of the real situation, that the Palestinians were not simply being removed 
or killed.  Their homes, villages, shops and farmland were either being destroyed or confiscated 
by new Jewish settlers, making any wholesale return of Palestinians much more complicated.  
The Zionist settlement of former Arab land is a concept that continued to change the map, thus 
making the partition of Palestine as proposed in November 1947 largely impossible.   
The Israeli denial of the right of return crystallized into an unwavering steadfastness 
during the months that followed their initial decision.  The Israelis were acutely aware of the 
changing, and by the end of the summer concretely altered, realities on the ground in Palestine.  
They had everything to gain from the dispersion of Palestinian Arabs, whether they had left 
willfully or otherwise, thus adding credence to the argument that the IDF and the Revisionist 
paramilitaries were intentionally killing or removing them by force.  Top Israeli officials in 1949 
argued against repatriation by explaining these realities as they existed, and in fact had since the 
summer before.  They wrote that “during the war and the Arab exodus, the basis of their 
economic life crumbled away.  Moveable property…has disappeared…Thousands of town and 
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village dwellings have been destroyed in the course of the fighting or in order to deny their use to 
enemy forces…And of those which remain habitable, most are serving as temporary homes for 
[Jewish] immigrants.”278  Not only did the Palestinians have little of which to return, but if there 
was something, it had been confiscated by the new Israeli immigrants.  The situation as 
envisioned by the Partition Plan of November 1947, though in no way perfect even then, had 
been literally uprooted.  
Aside from a refusal to plan for a repatriation of the displaced Arab population, Israel 
also thought that the whole of Jerusalem should be within the Jewish state, which was a 
substantial modification of the Partition Plan as well as of Bernadotte’s peace proposal.  
Interestingly, Bernadotte took comfort in knowing that he was not the only one willing to be 
flexible in his approach to the Partition Plan as he made suggestions for a prolonged peace.279  
Self-serving as it was, he was glad that even the Israeli leadership did not share the sentiment of 
the Soviet representatives to the UN who had berated his diversion from the agreed upon 
territorial assignments.  However, this was still a deflection from what consumed Bernadotte for 
the remainder of the summer; the Palestinian refugee problem. 
 Bernadotte next travelled to Amman to meet with King Abdullah and the Transjordanian 
prime minister.  He also conducted a preliminary examination of the refugee problem while 
there.  His discussion with the Arab leadership was more productive than that with Shertok as 
they were willing to accept the present situation and claimed to be simply in a search for peace.  
They understood more than Azzam Pasha that there could no longer be a Palestinian state or a 
favorable outcome from the war for the Arabs without the presence of an independent Jewish 
state.  Though supportive of the Palestinian refugees to a degree, the King and PM, like all other 
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Arab nations at this point, were more concerned with the conflict.  Bernadotte was still mainly 
concerned with the humanitarian situation that was developing.  
In the same report submitted on behalf of the Mediator in September detailing the 
violations of the ceasefires, Bernadotte concluded with a discussion of the facet of this conflict 
that affected him most deeply.  The Palestinian refugee problem, by the end of the summer, had 
reached terrible proportions.  Bernadotte had discovered that it was “vaster and more baffling 
than [he] had imagined.”280  While crafting his progress report at this time, he claimed that the 
number of refugees was around three hundred thousand.  Some historical records, however, have 
placed those numbers over four hundred thousand even by mid-summer.281  In contrast, 
Bernadotte mentions that only seven thousand “Jewish women and children from… areas 
occupied by the Arabs sought refuge within Jewish-controlled territory.”282  These numbers of 
displaced Arabs, as well as the need to prevent the outbreak of epidemics and disturbances 
among the refugees, was seen as a humanitarian concern of the utmost importance to Bernadotte.  
He had almost lost sight of the violent struggles involved in the war and the irregular fighting 
forces which were a more immediate threat.   
In fact, his original typewritten Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on 
Palestine reflected this attitude.  Completed the day before his death on 16 September, he at 
some point used a pen to scratch out the title of Part Three, “Humanitarian Work,” and replaced 
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it with “Assistance to Refugees” to make more specific the problem as he saw it.283  Bernadotte’s 
progress report had several pages in which he discussed the Palestinian refugee problem as it 
existed at the time.  In his estimation, “as a result of the conflict in Palestine, almost the whole of 
the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation.”284  Some 
responsibility lay with the United Nations, according to his report.  Palestinians were not citizens 
of the neighboring Arab states, often outnumbering “the local residents approximately 2:1,” and 
since they were under the British Mandate for Palestine they were within a “territory for whose 
future the United Nations had assumed responsibility.”285  This observation was directed mainly 
toward the immediate needs of the refugees, which included food and medicine but also “activity 
to occupy the attention of the refugees.”286  Bernadotte was so concerned that he even took care 
to address their mental well-being in his section on “immediate needs.”  As far as repatriation for 
these displaced people, Bernadotte showed his misunderstanding of an already dire reality by 
suggesting that refugees be allowed to return.  “Even though in many localities their homes had 
been destroyed… it was obvious that a solution for their difficulties could be more readily found 
there than elsewhere.”287  Though he was half right, in that the Arab states were ill-equipped for 
the massive influx of refugees, the land that the Palestinians had left was no longer waiting for 
them.   
In a report that covered so much of the war and the realities of what the conflict had been 
during the summer of 1948, Bernadotte paid special attention, in fact ending his report with, the 
Palestinian refugee crisis.  Coupled with his personal account written that summer, it is clear that 
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this was swiftly becoming his top priority, perhaps even more important than peace.  He knew 
that something had to be done.  Unfortunately, this report would be the last one he ever wrote as 
he travelled on a fateful tour of Jerusalem the next day that claimed his life.  
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CHAPTER 9:  ASSASSINATION 
For all of Bernadotte’s commendable concern for the problems that befell the Palestinian 
refugees and the humanitarian cause as he saw it, namely repatriation or compensation for a 
displaced population suffering in exile, his peace proposal had already set in motion an enemy 
which would not be stopped.  Israel Eldad, the ideological leader of Lehi, believed that “if the 
world listens to Bernadotte and pressures our weakling government into making compromises 
we will have lost our state.  We can’t let this happen.”288  He met in the Tel Aviv apartment of 
Lehi commander Nathan Friedman-Yellin along with the de facto leader Shamir.  Together they 
represented the three leaders of the group the British called the Stern Gang and that in previous 
meetings had planned the assassinations of Lord Moyne and Sir Harold MacMichael, though the 
British High Commissioner for Palestine escaped injured.  Political assassinations were nothing 
new to Lehi and the three had now set their sights on the offensive UN Mediator and the 
international meddling that he represented.  “Over wine and fruit the three decided to kill the 
Mediator and have a phantom organization called the ‘Fatherland Front’ publicly claim 
responsibility for the crime.”289  After their deliberation on the matter, they communicated their 
wishes immediately to Yehoshua Zetler who was Lehi commander in Jerusalem.  Zetler was to 
carry out the plot along with his intelligence officer, Stanley Goldfoot, and his deputy, Yehoshua 
Cohen.  Cohen was an ardent Zionist who was “reputed for his courage and ingenuity” and “did 
not hate, or need to hate, his enemies in order to ‘execute’ them in cold blood and in good 
conscience.”290  Goldfoot, as a journalist, had access to the information about Bernadotte’s habits 
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and schedule that would aid in the details of the assassination mission.  Leading up to the day of 
their operation, leaflets had been distributed warning Bernadotte to leave Palestine as well as 
issuing threats on his life because of his proposals.  There is no evidence, however, that 
Bernadotte was ever aware of these specific warnings in the days that led up to his death.  As the 
details of his murder would show, he was not in the least concerned for his safety during his trip 
to Jerusalem in September of 1948. 
The account of the Mediator’s assassination and the events that immediately preceded 
and followed were detailed in a thorough memorandum sent to the United Nations by the 
Permanent Representative of Sweden, Sven Grafström, on 24 March 1950.  The memorandum 
was thorough as it explained both the Mediator’s mission and the details of the irregular forces 
on the ground at the time.  The memorandum is largely an indictment of the Israeli investigators’ 
handling of the crime scene and attempts to actually apprehend the culprits.  The memorandum 
linked the Revisionist assassins with a possible plot by the government that has never been 
substantiated, though the outcome was beneficial for Zionism as a whole.   
According to the memorandum, Count Bernadotte’s itinerary for that fateful weekend 
included a round trip through the region, though it did not contain any details on what he wished 
to accomplish in each place he was to visit.  After finishing work on his final proposal on 
Thursday, 16 September, he boarded his iconic white plane provided him by the United Nations 
and left his headquarters on Rhodes.  He went to Beirut that morning accompanied by Lieutenant 
Jan de Geer, chief of his personal staff, Dr. Rudolf Ullmark, his physician, Ms. Barbro Wessel, 
his secretary and his valet, Kull.291  The purpose of the trip to Beirut was to pick up two more 
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passengers, UN Truce Commission Chief of Staff General Aage Lundström and his aide-de-
camp, Colonel Miles Flach.292   
The convoy reached Damascus that same day by midafternoon and spent the rest of the 
day and night awaiting a flight to Jerusalem.  At 10:30 am Friday, 17 September, Bernadotte and 
his party landed at Qalandiya airfield in the Arab sector north of Jerusalem, ignoring a warning 
that their aircraft would be fired on.  The tension in the area was palpable, but no credible threat 
was included with this communication.  There they met with several United Nations observers.  
Most notable among them was French Colonel André Sérot, the chief UN observer in Jerusalem.  
Bernadotte, Lundström, and several other observers left the airfield by car for Ramallah in order 
to see the commander of the Arab Legion, Brigadier General Norman Lash.  The rest of the party 
went south to Jerusalem to await their return and to journey together across the front lines.  
Entrance into Jerusalem, which would take the convoy through the front lines, had been 
protested by Lundström, however to no avail.  Bernadotte wished to take the same risks as every 
other observer under his command and “no one had the right to stop him passing through the 
lines wherever he wished.”293  This was a sentiment shared by Bernadotte several times over the 
course of the dangerous journey ahead.294  Lundström in fact suggested an armed escort for their 
trip back to Jerusalem but was met with the same rejection by Bernadotte who felt it “his right as 
Mediator to go wherever he wanted in Palestine unarmed and without protection.”295 
Lundström ignored this order and secured an armed escort to meet them further up the 
road to Jerusalem while the convoy continued on to meet the rest of their party at the American 
School in Jerusalem.  They crossed the front lines to the Jewish side at 12:30 that afternoon and 
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met with American Colonel Frank Begley of the United Nations and an Israeli liaison officer, 
Captain Moshe Hillman.  There was no further Israeli escort from that point.  Bunche later 
condemned the Israeli Provisional Government for this lack of protection for the Mediator.  
Jerusalem was a chaotic place at the time both for the residents and the fighting forces.  A New 
York Times correspondent cabled a message to his offices in New York describing the situation 
in the city two days after Bernadotte’s tour: 
The people here have developed what is called the ‘Jerusalem crouch.’  When crossing 
danger zones they stoop to make themselves smaller targets for sharpshooters with 
telescopic sights.  Many homes are pockmarked by machine gun bullets, sandbags take 
the place of smashed windows.  The standard ration of water is half a pail a day.  Food is 
expensive and diets drab.  There is no fresh meat available and things like vegetables and 
fresh milk are hard to come by.296  
 
This description gives a small window into the horrors of the war-torn city that the convoy was 
expected to drive through without an armed guard.  Regardless of Bernadotte’s lack of concern 
and sense of diplomatic right, General Lundström was correct in assuming it was the 
responsibility of the Israeli military and government to provide protection in this war zone.   
 Bernadotte’s wish was to visit Government House, which was situated in a neutral zone 
in the south of the city.  He wanted to examine it as a future headquarters for the remainder of his 
mission.  After lunch at the YMCA building, the convoy departed south for Government House 
at 3 p.m.  Two cars were used to accommodate the observers joining Bernadotte, a De Soto and a 
Chrysler both with the United Nations flag and a white flag.  The flags were important since the 
cars were without an escort and all of the passengers were unarmed and passing through 
dangerous territory.  The route taken was out of the way and filled with small detours due to the 
military situation in the city at the time and, it is important to note, was the only route available 
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to get between these two points.  Goldfoot relayed this information to his Lehi co-conspirators as 
he heard it and the schedule over the amplifier at the government press office.297  In the Swedish 
Representative’s memorandum, he makes mention many times of the fact that Bernadotte’s 
arrival and destinations were easily known to those who wished to have that information.  The 
fact that his route was the only realistic one suggests that the return journey from Government 
House to their staging point at the YMCA in the north could be plotted and timed by the would 
be assailants.  The ten minute journey to Government House was uneventful other than a stop at 
an Israeli military checkpoint.298   
The inspection of the quarters at Government House, guided by Dr. Fasel of the Red 
Cross, went smoothly.  The convoy then left.  After a short detour to visit a nearby school, the 
party began their journey back to the YMCA.  Dr. Fasel drove his own car and the now three 
vehicle convoy consisted of five observers in the front car, Dr. Fasel in the second, and five in 
the third car, including Count Bernadotte and Col. Sérot.  Sérot had made a last minute seat 
change before the trip back to Jewish-held Jerusalem.  He switched with Capt. Hillman, who was 
in between Bernadotte and Lundström in the back of the third car, so that he could speak with 
Bernadotte.  He explained that his wife was Jewish and had survived Dachau.  She owed her 
survival to Bernadotte and wanted to thank him.  This ill-timed display of gratitude cost him his 
life.   
The convoy then proceeded back along the route they had taken to Government House 
and, passing through the aforementioned checkpoint once more, they came along a small police 
roadblock, which soon let them pass.  While passing through the El Qatamon quarter of 
Jerusalem, the convoy reached a hill where they were stopped by a jeep that blocked the road 
                                                          
297 Kurzman, Ben-Gurion, 301. 
298 UNSC, Communication, (S/1474), 27 March 1950, 12-13. 
88 
 
where there were buildings on both sides.  The jeep contained a driver and three armed men, all 
Jewish and wearing Israeli military uniforms: Zetler, Cohen, and Goldfoot.  Upon stopping the 
convoy, two of the armed men exited the jeep and proceeded along the right hand side of the first 
car while the third walked along the left side of the convoy towards the last car in which 
Bernadotte was sitting.  After Capt. Hillman pleaded with the men in Hebrew to allow the 
convoy to pass, all three men opened fire.  The two men in the front shot out the tires of the first 
car while the third plunged his weapon into the open rear window of the third and opened fire.  A 
number of bullets struck both Bernadotte and Sérot.  The three men quickly fled, two in the jeep 
and one on foot, leaving behind the barrel and magazine of his Schmeisser machinegun.  Sérot 
and Bernadotte were killed instantly.  In a post mortem examination in Haifa it was determined 
that Bernadotte had been struck six times in the left arm, chest and upper part of his stomach and 
Sérot eighteen times in his right arm, head and chest.299 
After taking a quick toll of what had happened, an event that had lasted only a few 
seconds, the drivers sped off to the Old Hadassah Hospital only a few minutes’ drive away where 
it was confirmed that both of the men in the backseat had been killed.  On the scene, after the 
vehicles had left, several witnesses were questioned by the Israeli police, who were only a couple 
of hundred meters away at the time.  A Jewish soldier nearby had run to the scene, retrieving the 
machinegun parts that had been dropped by the assassin.  This began the preliminary stage of an 
Israeli investigation that came under much scrutiny in the years that followed.  The handling of 
the crime scene was disorganized.  It was not cordoned off for some time.  The machinegun parts 
were passed between several agencies and were thus heavily contaminated evidence.  The 
witnesses were never questioned fully and a line-up of suspects was never provided for the 
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identification of the assassins by the ten other officials in the convoy.  The lack of a line-up came 
under particular scrutiny as the weeks following the murder were marked by a round-up of Lehi 
members, “partly in order to find those responsible for the murder and partly in order to wipe out 
the Stern Gang.”300  On the evening of the murder, a communication reached UN observers 
containing a declaration by Hazit Hamoledeth (the Fatherland Front) that they had committed the 
crime.  Leaflets in Hebrew were also distributed around Jerusalem that same evening, stating: 
On the 17th of September 1948 we have executed Count Bernadotte. 
Count Bernadotte served as an open agent of the British enemy.  His task was to 
implement the British plans for the surrender of our country to a foreign rule and the 
exposure of the Yishuv.  He did not hesitate to suggest the handing-over of Jerusalem to 
Abdullah.  Bernadotte acted without interruption towards the weakening of our military 
efforts and was responsible for the blood-shed. 
This will be the end of all the enemies and their agents.  
This will be the end of all the enemies of Jewish freedom in the Homeland. 
There will be no foreign rule in the Homeland.  There shall be no longer foreign 
Commissioners in Jerusalem.  
 Hazit Hamoledeth, 17th September, 1948301 
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CHAPTER 10:  ISRAEL AFTER BERNADOTTE 
The assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte and its aftermath created ripples in Israel 
that were felt for decades.  With the UN Mediator out of the way, the Revisionists transformed 
once again, and the Palestinian refugee crisis lost its biggest advocate.  The discussion continued, 
Israeli politics whipped into a flurry, and the war ended, thus cementing the Jewish state, and the 
continuum of conflict with the Palestinians and surrounding Arab states.  The processes that led 
from Jabotinsky to Bernadotte ended the Mediator’s life and began a trend that persisted during 
the formative period of Israel’s existence.  
On the account of swift investigations by the Israeli military, Ben-Gurion declared a state 
of emergency in Jerusalem and quickly determined that the Fatherland Front was a branch of 
Lehi.  However, there was no evidence that the front ever existed.  During the first week after the 
assassination, 184 Lehi members in Jerusalem and 82 in the rest of the country were detained.302  
The suspects were sent to “detention camps” and large caches of arms were seized all across the 
country, particularly in Jerusalem.303  Ben-Gurion called “’on the nation to rise as one man 
against the enemy within its midst’ and to ‘give active and unhesitating assistance to the army 
and police in apprehending the assassins and their accomplices and expunging the stain of 
terrorism from the soil’ of Israel.”304  During the period of the British Mandate, Israelis had been 
reluctant to aid in the apprehension of terrorist groups because they were united against a 
common enemy, the British.  According to journalist Julian Louise Meltzer of the New York 
Times in 1948, “Zionists had political grievances against the British Government and felt that 
terrorism would be best eradicated by removing its cause rather than by employing 
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palliatives.”305  By this point of the conflict, however, terrorism was becoming a black eye on the 
legitimacy of the state and the people that wanted to see the fighting come to an end.  Ben-
Gurion’s call for public assistance in the apprehension of the assassins showed the seriousness 
with which the Jewish state admonished terrorist acts near the end of the year.  The use of the 
word terrorist is itself revealing.  These groups were Jewish brothers-in-arms working toward the 
same goal, but were now involved in violent acts that the government was unable to publicly 
support.  “The worst enemies of Israel are those within its borders…no Arab armies could have 
done so much harm in so short a time.”306   
After the death of Bernadotte, the Provisional Government passed the “Emergency 
Regulations for the Prevention of Terrorism” Ordinance that defined terrorism and the 
punishments that accompanied such a verdict.  A terrorist organization, according to the 
ordinance, was defined as “a body of persons which in its operations makes use of acts of 
violence which are liable to cause the death of a person or to injure them, or threats of such acts 
of violence,” making no mention of the political nature of such acts.307  Having been drafted in 
September, just days after the Mediator’s assassination, this was clearly in response to and 
directed at the actions of Lehi, though it would define for years the policy of Israel toward the 
1948 Palestinians.  The ordinance also mandated that any person accused of this crime would be 
tried before military tribunal.  Friedman-Yellin and another Lehi commander, Matityahu 
Shmuelevitz, were captured along with others of their Lehi brethren shortly after in Haifa.  The 
two commanders were formally charged by the Military Prosecutor under the Emergency 
                                                          
305 Julian Louise Meltzer, “Israelis Are Attempting to Root Out Terrorists,” The New York Times, 
September 26, 1948. ProQuest (108294805). 
306 “The U.N. Must Act.” 
307 UN Security Council, “Cablegram…from Ralph Bunche to the Secretary-General  
Transmitting a Summary of Emergency Regulations for the Prevention of Terrorism Issued by 
the Defence Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel,” (S/1008), 22 September, 1948. 
92 
 
Regulations (Prevention of Terrorism) ordinance “with being leaders of an illegal terrorist 
organization” and Friedman-Yellin “was also charged with possessing an arms store allegedly 
discovered in his house.”308  Even two school girls were detained and tried posting Lehi posters 
that incited violence against the Mediator.  However, their testimonies, among others, claimed 
that Lehi in Israel was a legal political organization and the acts of those in Jerusalem, a territory 
not officially under Israeli control, were not under their command jurisdiction.309   
In fact, most of the detained Lehi commanders and soldiers claimed that the group had 
become legitimate upon Israeli independence on 14 May, at least within Israeli jurisdictional 
boundaries.  In Friedman-Yellin’s testimony to a military court he pointed out that he was a 
civilian and that he was being targeted.  He felt that the decision of guilt for him and other Lehi 
members was predetermined.310  He also declared that there was no connection between Lehi and 
the Fatherland Front and clung to the guise that the Front was the ones responsible, though he 
knew full well that they had never existed in the first place.311  He claimed that “it was clear that 
the arrests were not for interrogation but to break up the party.”312  The search for the assassins, 
however, never produced any viable suspects and not a single member of Lehi was convicted for 
the murders of either Bernadotte or Sérot. 
The outcomes sought by Lehi were clear and ultimately came to fruition.  Bernadotte’s 
plan for Palestine and the assistance to refugees was abandoned after his assassination. Israel 
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won control over the bulk of historic Palestine and the refugee crisis remained unsolved.  Though 
the Palestinian refugee problem has continued to be discussed ever since, there would be no such 
voice for the displaced Arabs as Bernadotte’s.  After Dr. Bunche took over mediation duties, a 
continuing war was interspersed with cease-fires.  However, he was eventually able to complete 
the mediation process and armistices were signed between Israel and the individual Arab nations 
throughout the early part of 1949.  Following Bernadotte’s work, his efforts earned him a Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1950. 
 In a New York Times article on 26 September, 1948 an unknown Lehi soldier made it 
clear how the Mediator was viewed by his group: 
The Homeland Front sees Israel’s principal enemy in imperialism.  Bernadotte was killed 
primarily because the Homeland Front regarded him primarily as an agent of 
imperialism.  He came to be seen as Anglo-American attempts to whittle down Israel’s 
sovereignty and just territorial claims.313 
 
Even Ben-Gurion saw Bernadotte as a hindrance to the creation of Israel when asked to recall his 
actions during the 1948 war.  Henri Vigier, a Special Adviser who played a key role in the 
mediation process, later recalled a talk between Bunche and Ben-Gurion in which the premier 
said that “neither the Great Powers nor the U.N. had helped Israel when she was attacked by the 
Arab States in 1948.”314  When Bunche reminded him of Bernadotte’s involvement, Ben-Gurion 
“did not seem to have any recollection of the role played by Count Bernadotte at the time.  He 
expressed regret at [his] death, then said emphatically that he had done them harm.”315  It is 
worth noting a discovery by Israeli historian Michael Bar-Zohar seventeen years after the events 
of 1948.  He found in Ben-Gurion’s journal, dated 19 September 1948, the three names of the 
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men responsible for assassinating Bernadotte.316  Only two days after he was killed, Ben-Gurion 
knew the names of those suspected of killing the Mediator.  Ben-Gurion claimed that he did not 
know at first that these men were in fact those responsible.  But upon calling in one of the three 
assailants with whom the PM had “grown friendly” over the years, but who was not named for 
his protection, Ben-Gurion said “he confessed.”317 
Had Bernadotte lived one more week, he would have met the UN in Paris to lay out his 
new plan for peace, the same plan that concluded with an in depth survey of the refugee crisis, 
and the plan later submitted by Dr. Bunche in his name.  The new plan was essentially a revision 
of the first “Bernadotte Plan.”  In fact, American and British delegates attempted that week to 
rush it through the UN General Assembly, both of which very much in favor of his conclusions.  
U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall lauded Bernadotte for his efforts and for his fair 
approach to negotiations.318  These efforts, however, faltered in face of opposition from the 
Soviet bloc states that felt that Bernadotte took liberties and was a puppet of the Western 
democracies.  The plan fell to third on the committee’s agenda.319  A rumor surfaced in a 
newspaper article that Bernadotte was set to call on UN military action pursuant to Article 42 of 
its charter, though the final report submitted by Bunche does not explicitly mention that 
request.320  Bernadotte had definitely left that option open, however.  He conceded that he did 
“not consider it to be within [his] province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations 
a proposed course of action on the Palestine question” and that it was the responsibility of its 
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members to work “through the appropriate organs.”321  He felt that military force for any 
involved party was not the answer to peace in Palestine but did at length argue that force by the 
Arabs or Jews should not be tolerated and that the UN needed to be more involved in the 
situation.   
Were Bernadotte the representative of one nation, there would be retaliation, militarily or 
economically; but “what, then, will the nations do about the cold-blooded murder of a man who, 
in theory at least, represented them all?”322  That was a question that confronted the international 
community.  If military action were to be taken by the international body, who would be willing 
to provide that sort of force?  The United States and Soviet Union were the first to recognize the 
Israeli state and were steeped in Cold War posturing that could not afford an armed escalation of 
any kind.  Also, the U.S. was in an election year and could not afford engaging in armed conflict 
just three years out of the Second World War, particularly in a Jewish state since there was such 
a large Jewish-American constituency.  In response to objections from some of his advisors, 
Truman said, “I’m sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are 
anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my 
constituents.”323  Fifty eight nations were represented by the Mediator and their only response 
after his death was to demand an investigation and replace him.  That is a clear sign of their 
inability, or lack of desire, to act in what was their first real test of effectiveness.324  Ralph 
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Bunche, in succeeding Bernadotte, did not carry the voice that the first Mediator held in the UN 
and largely let his predecessor’s priorities fade away with him.   
Bunche inherited a position as Mediator of a conflict that was already under an indefinite 
truce and experienced an easier transition as he had already been acting as Bernadotte’s assistant 
during the war.  His goals were, comparatively, limited and though there continued to be 
violations of the truce on both sides, his main priority was a lasting peace between Israel and the 
Arab states.  In November the UN drafted a resolution calling for an armistice between the states 
involved in the conflict.  It was thus Bunche’s job to seek out their representatives and negotiate 
such a peace.  In this, Bunche was effective.  By the middle of the next year, Israel had agreed to 
armistices with the countries of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt, with the fighting forces 
of Iraq and Saudi Arabia falling under the agreements of those countries.  In his report of 26 July 
1949, Bunche could announce that “the fighting in Palestine has ended.”325  Before that end was 
reached however, the Acting Mediator showed where his efforts lacked in respect to his 
predecessor.326  
It became clear that a priority of Bernadotte’s was the Palestinian refugee problem, an 
issue he studied greatly while under fire and facilitating two truces between the warring parties.  
Bernadotte, within weeks had introduced a truce in Palestine.  Though that ceasefire could not be 
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extended due to objections by both sides pertaining to advantages gained, he was able to institute 
another, indefinite, truce which outlasted even his own life.  On top of those efforts, he was able 
to see the growing problem of refugees and humanitarian issues surrounding the conflict.  
Bunche, on the other hand, in his report on the armistices the next year, never once mentioned 
the refugee crisis which continued to grow.  In fact, there is no official document from the 
Acting Mediator that referenced the displaced Palestinians.  A major violation of the truce under 
his supervision, during October 1948, was an Israeli advance in both Galilee and the Negev, the 
two areas to which the refugees had fled.  There was even a report by Bunche on the Israeli 
occupation of Lebanese villages in the frontier and within Lebanon proper, as well as organized 
looting by the IDF of these homes and farmlands.  The situation was getting worse and Bunche’s 
answer was less than expected.   
In December, the UN drafted a resolution that established the Palestine Conciliation 
Commission, a body that would “assume… the functions given to the United Nations Mediator 
on Palestine.”327  In the midst of mediating negotiations between Israel and Egypt, Bunche saw 
this as a welcome sign of relief.  Rather than heading that body that would absorb, in so far as it 
felt necessary, his meditation duties, Bunche chose to step aside.  In a cable to the UN in 
January, he called attention to the resolution establishing the Conciliation Commission, 
essentially requesting to terminate his duties.  He admittedly could not “predict… whether 
similar negotiations [to those of Egypt] involving other Arab States will take place in the near 
future.”328  Instead of continuing the peace process, Bunche was trying to be relieved.  By the 
time the armistices were signed in July 1949, he ended his report on those negotiations and the 
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truces that accompanied the war, with another plea to let the commission take over his duties.  
He called attention once again to that resolution and requested the “termination or the transfer to 
the [commission] of such functions as now remain to the position of Mediator under Security 
Council resolution.”329  With the war over, “there is no longer any useful function to be 
performed by the Mediator.”330  For his efforts, Bunche was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1950.   
By the end of 1948, the adoption of the Palestine Conciliation Commission should have 
negated the ineffectiveness of the Acting Mediator to work toward a refugee settlement, instead 
Israeli power dominated and the status quo remained in place.  The resolution that established the 
commission also set forth rules that the UN was expected to uphold regarding the refugees.  It 
stated clearly the UN’s outline for the right of return.  The General Assembly, in UN Resolution 
194, resolved: 
…that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss 
of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity, should 
be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.331 
 
This resolution, thanks to Bernadotte and in spite of Bunche’s lack of concern with the problem, 
should have been the basis for solving the Palestinian refugee problem in a timely fashion, even 
against the reality of destroyed or occupied homes and villages.  Once again, however, the UN 
would show just how ineffective it could be as it would resist acting aggressively to enforce its 
own resolutions.  Instead, the state of Israel began its political process in the fall and winter of 
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1948 and 1949 unencumbered by the plight of the Palestinians.  The new national narrative 
would build from this point on into a new era of statehood, awaiting yet another transformation.   
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CHAPTER 11:  THE JEWISH STATE 
Following the actions of the UN Mediator in the summer of 1948, the war continued for a 
while but open hostilities eventually ceased.  The war had created a new reality that left 
displaced Palestinians stuck in the middle, solidified animosity between Jews and Arabs in the 
region, and began the formation of a national narrative in Israel.  The Iron Wall Doctrine was 
firmly in place.  Politics were paramount in the formation of the state, but they were also 
important to what it meant to be Israeli.  The events that occurred over the next three decades 
shaped that identity and the Israeli identification of the Palestinians.  First under Labor 
leadership, Israel helped construct the basis of what is now understood as the Israel/Palestine 
conflict.  The memory of Zionist violence either disappeared or became canonized as heroic and 
legendary.  At the same time, the identity of the Arabs in the eyes of Israelis was defined through 
a history of violence.  Historian Tarak Barkawi pointed out that “In and through war, people on 
both sides come to intensified awareness of one another, reconstruct images of self and other, 
initiate and react to each other’s moves.  To be at war is to be interconnected with the enemy.”332  
Joanna Bourke offers a further insight into collective memory that echoes what Israeli historian 
Eran Kaplan said about the concept of history being written by the victors in Israel.  She said 
that: 
Too often, memory is portrayed as simply an elite production, imposing a dominant view 
on the populace.  While not disputing the fact that the state is certainly at the heart of 
memory-making, it remains important to identify what and which part of the state is 
imposing their script on which others.333 
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The Labor party, or Mapai, was able to disband the Revisionist paramilitaries, thus establishing 
the Labor movement’s influence over the creation of memory in Israel.  At the same time the 
actions of the underground gained legendary status and were also legitimized.  Street names in 
Israel to this day still honor those once deemed to have been terrorists.  That process actually 
began before the war was even over.  
In the fall of 1948, Nathan Friedman-Yellin and others went on trial in Israel for their war 
crimes, which only provided them with a political platform.  Friedman-Yellin was ultimately 
exonerated and even elected into the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.334  Around the time of 
Bernadotte’s assassination and the disbanding of Lehi, a general amnesty was issued by the 
Provisional Government that cleared all persons on trial or in prison of similar crimes.  After 
Lehi was disbanded, many of its fighters in Jerusalem were absorbed by the IDF, with the 
exception of some who, like Shamir, went underground once again.  After becoming aware of 
discrimination within the IDF against former Lehi members, Shamir set up a clandestine meeting 
with a high ranking Israeli official who turned out to be the Deputy Minister of Defense, Shaul 
Avigur.  With a promise he would not be arrested, he met with Avigur and pleaded the case of 
the former members of Lehi: 
Lehi is through with its former role…We may perhaps go into politics.  The degree of 
illegality must be annulled and Lehi members must be released from jail.  If not, we shall 
never feel completely safe and the underground will never totally die.335 
 
Avigur wanted the names of Bernadotte’s assassins in trade for any such amnesty.  He promised 
that they would not be arrested.  He promised that he just wanted the names for filing purposes, 
so the state would know.  Shamir responded with a simple, “No.”  A few days later, the 
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government acquiesced to his demands anyway.336  The general amnesty was signed by Ben-
Gurion and all Lehi and Irgun members at the time incarcerated were released.    
Many of the Revisionists now turned to politics and went on to hold high office, even as 
prime minister, as was the case with Shamir and the Irgun leader, Menachem Begin, but it was 
the Labor party that ran the nation for the next three decades.  Immediately following the war, 
Ben-Gurion’s Israel found itself a Zionist island floating in a sea of hostile states and of 
questionable legitimacy.  The Arab states remained hostile and the international community had 
not yet accepted fully the idea of the state built on war.  What became Israel’s national borders 
had changed from the agreed upon Partition Plan, strayed from Bernadotte’s proposals and, as 
Jabotinsky would have it, were created through military action.  As pointed out earlier, this was 
also the view of the new prime minister.  Ben-Gurion, for all of his political and ideological 
differences with the Revisionist founder, was a man of action that, at least militarily when it 
came to the Palestinians, was more than sympathetic to the Iron Wall Doctrine.  The Declaration 
of Independence signed in May 1948 called for a constitution to be constructed that would, like 
the American government, be the ruling document of the land.  However, like the British, the 
fledgling government decided not to draft a constitution, most likely at the behest of Ben-Gurion 
himself.337  That decision placated the various rights hoped for by the complex Jewish groups in 
Israel, avoiding enumerated state mandates that could advantage one group over another.  It also 
maintained what the original declaration for the state had subtly left open for the future; a nation 
without defined boundaries, one that could be expanded.  The Basic Laws that followed, a form 
of legislation that circumvented the need for a constitution and left power in the ruling party’s 
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hands, gave Ben-Gurion the freedom to operate almost without impunity to expand the 
boundaries of the 1948 state. 
 Under the Labor Party’s leadership the main threat to the Jewish state was the 
surrounding hostile Arabs.  Governments like Egypt and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon became the 
focus of the Labor prime ministers.  They saw those Arab militaries as the real threat to their 
existence.  At the same time, they needed to build a state that would define Israeli life and 
politics aside from their foreign policy concerns, effectively separating policies toward those 
Palestinians still living within Israel and the foreign Arab governments.  Historian Gershon 
Shafir described the Labor dominance of this period as “a Eurocentric colonial project that 
excluded most Mizrachim, Palestinian Arabs, and women from its benefits, and presented its 
successors with the pressing task of decolonization.”338  By that he meant that the Labor 
leadership had always been concerned most with the colonization process of Israel, originally 
built on the back of Jewish labor, and then an established class order that harkened back to the 
class struggles of Eastern Europe.  The Mizrachim were a lower class than those of European 
origin, or Ashkenazim.  The Palestinian Arabs, or the Israeli Arabs remaining within the borders 
of the new state known as the “1948 Arabs,” were the lowest, proletariat class in the region.   
 During the first two decades of Labor dominance in Israel, the Palestinian population had 
been reduced dramatically because of the war and they were thus not an internal threat, but were 
considerably restricted in their Israeli citizenship.  Their “rights were largely suspended in 
practice,” as they were administered by military rule and denied what would be considered 
ubiquitous rights of any regular citizen of a Western democracy.339  In fact, according to Shafir, 
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the great problem of the early Labor Zionists that sought to define the new state was the 
dichotomy of being a truly Jewish state while representing the virtues of Western democratic 
principles.  The military administration “imposed severe restrictions on [the 1948 Palestinians’] 
freedom of movement and economic opportunities, and placed them under surveillance and 
military law.”340  This largely controlled the laboring population of the country and the land that 
was worked in the face of large Mizrachi immigration during the 1950s.  The Palestinians of 
Israel were contained as third class citizens, and the frontier was kept in check by military 
presence and administration.  Frontier colonialism was still the virtue of true Labor Zionists, but 
until 1967 and the war that expanded Israel’s borders the leadership of Israel became content to 
cease frontier expansion and set up security borders while seeking diplomacy with the 
neighboring Arab states.341   
 In 1967, Israel defeated several Arab armies in a Six Day War that expanded their 
territory beyond the original Partition Plan and the 1948 armistice boundaries.  This absorbed a 
massive amount of stateless Palestinians and introduced entirely new problems to how the state 
would deal with the frontiers.  After independence and leading up to the 1967 conflict, a national 
priority of Israel had been Jewish settlement of frontier land and the expropriation of land owned 
by the Arabs of these regions.342  After the war, settlement activity erupted, even at times against 
the policy of the Israeli government, and the boundaries that were once recognized as the 
demarcation between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza had become blurred.  Palestinians 
outside of the original 1949 armistice boundaries were never granted citizenship in the 
“Occupied Territories,” but their labor had become a part of the state economy after that point.  
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All the while, the kibbutzim, settlers that pushed the boundaries of the original state, brought the 
relationship between these people to a boiling point.  For a decade the fire was reignited and 
along with the several years long War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Labor 
government had begun to lose hold of the situation.  Placating the radical elements of settlers by 
establishing kibbutz near largely populated Palestinian areas in the Occupied Territories led to 
the creation of religious settler groups like Gush Emunim in 1974.   
 Settler movements during this period redrew the map of Israel and maintained a 
maximalist view of Eretz Yisrael, much in the way that the more radical elements of the 
Revisionists had done years before.  Other groups also joined the principles of Gush Emunim’s 
settlement projects in the Occupied Territories because “it followed the traditional course of 
settlement, which carried with it an inherent aura of legitimacy, in a society where pioneering 
had been a core element of nationalism and a major source of prestige and influence.”343  The old 
Zionist colonialism had merged with the new Israelis.  The identity of what it was to be Israeli, 
or Zionist, was being stretched by the new generations that had largely only lived under Israeli 
rule by the mid-1970s, having no experience of the British Mandate or close social encounters 
with Palestinian neighbors.  These new settlers, however, did not carry with them the virtues of 
manual labor that defined the older, original settlers.  Their vision did not include a shovel or a 
pick-axe, but rather something that “conformed to the emerging new middle-class life style.”344   
By 1977, an entirely new generation of Israelis had grown up as natives in the Jewish 
state with a completely altered Israeli identity from their predecessors, and another entire 
demographic of Mizrachi immigrants had entered the citizenry.  The leadership was ripe for a 
change.  The new Israel looked to an old face heading a new political party that would change 
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their fortunes and alter the state further.  In the face of settlement expansion that included a 
growing middle-class Ashkenazi population, the Mizrachim were further relegated to lower class 
status.  Ever seen as less than the bourgeois European-style, middle-class Israelis, the Mizrachi 
population was relegated in these settlements to labor work and lowered, almost, to the status of 
the Arabs.  The answer for that was the old Irgun leader of the independence war, still in politics, 
Menachem Begin.  Having tried and failed to bring his Herut party to prominence, the party 
transformed slightly and the head of the new Likud Party succeeded in earning the job of prime 
minister in June 1977.  Begin before this had been a political opposition leader, with his Herut 
party challenging Mapai in the Knesset at every turn, but his political career actually began 
during the fateful war for independence.   
Begin began his political grandstanding as early as November 1948 at a dinner in New 
York while seeking American Jewish support for his party.  At this dinner he denounced the 
British and the Bernadotte plan, but predicted a peaceful future for Israel.  He claimed that “his 
people… will contribute to its full share toward the progress of all mankind and toward the 
emergence of a new world, a world free from want, free from oppression, free from fear.”345  
This call for goodwill included a “peace and brotherhood” that would “prevail among Arabs and 
Jews alike,” and he would in fact participate as prime minister in the 1979 Camp David Accords.  
However, according to some historians like Rashid Khalidi, these later peace talks were simply 
window dressing.  Begin remained a firm believer in the Iron Wall Doctrine all of his life.346   
This contradiction in the stance of Begin, whom would become the founder of the Likud 
by 1977, the right wing National Liberal Movement, did not go unnoticed by some prominent 
                                                          
345 “Former Irgun Leader Sees Palestine Unity With Brotherhood Among Jews and Arabs.” The 
New York Times, November 30, 1948. ProQuest (108236499). 
346 Rashid Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2013), 1-28. 
107 
 
members of the international Jewish community.  In a letter to the New York Times on 4 
December 1948, a group of Jews attempted to show the world just with whom they were dealing.  
Begin ran for office with his new party, Tnuat Haherut, shortened as Herut or the “Freedom 
Party,” which was blatantly called fascist in this publication.  The letter, signed by Albert 
Einstein, Hannah Arendt, and around two dozen other prominent Jews, stated that:  
Among the most disturbing political phenomena of our time is the emergence in the 
newly created state of Israel of the “Freedom Party,” apolitical party closely akin in its 
organization, methods, political philosophy and social appeal to the Nazi and Fascist 
parties.  It was formed out of the membership and following of the former Irgun Zvai 
Leumi, a terrorist, right-wing, chauvinist organization in Palestine.347 
 
The letter was in response to a visit to the United States while campaigning for Israeli office with 
American Zionist organizations.  The letter continued by undermining his supporters by saying 
that it was “inconceivable that those who oppose fascism throughout the world, if correctly 
informed as to Mr. Begin’s political record and perspectives, could add their names and support 
to the movement he represents.”348  This letter was clearly a call to enlighten the world as to 
Begin’s past with the Irgun and what that group represented.   
 Einstein, Arendt, and the others who signed that letter opened a dialogue with this article 
that may have kept Begin from earning his first political office in 1948, as well as providing a 
vision of what would eventually come from his political control in Israel.  The letter continued 
by describing in astounding detail the events of the Deir Yassin massacre to inform the American 
Zionist supporters of the true pedigree of the “Freedom Party” and of what they were really 
capable.  In prophetic fashion, the article introduced the terrorist chronicle with a truly 
denouncing statement: 
                                                          
347 “New Palestine Party: Visit of Menachem Begin and Aims of Political Movement 
Discussed,” New York Times, December 4, 1948, ProQuest (108368346). 
348 Ibid.  
108 
 
Today they speak of freedom, democracy and anti-imperialism, whereas until recently 
they openly preached the doctrine of the Fascist state.  It is in its actions that the terrorist 
party betrays its real character: from its past actions we can judge what it may be 
expected to do in the future.349 
 
It took roughly thirty years to come to fruition, but the authors of this letter would be proven 
correct.  The Iron Wall Doctrine so firmly ingrained in the Revisionist right could not be swept 
away with political double speak and rhetoric about freedom.  That doctrine had unfortunately 
been seeping into the ranks of the Labor leaders as well and the construction of the Israeli 
national narrative was cementing for years, as was proved in the period following the war and 
leading up to the Likud takeover in 1977.  The damage was done and Jabotinsky’s legacy, 
however altered, as well as the effect of Bernadotte’s involvement, would live on.  
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CHAPTER 12:  THE IRON WALL LEGACY 
 The Iron Wall Doctrine that lives to the present was galvanized by the Likud party’s rise 
to power in 1977 and was championed by the leadership of Israel, specifically through three 
Revisionist prime ministers over the next several decades.  Beginning with Menachem Begin, the 
issue of the Palestinian people would become a point of contention and a political tool for 
insincere rhetorical peace initiatives that never came to fruition.  Yitzhak Shamir carried that 
mantle in the 1980s, always an ardent believer in the principles that Jabotinsky inspired into the 
Revisionist movement.  In the new millennium, Benjamin Netanyahu has continued and even 
exacerbated this conflict through not only his actions but his political rhetoric.  Almost a century 
later, the tenets of Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall have consistently been a part of Israeli leaders’ 
doctrine of dealing with the native Arab population of the region.   
 On 17 May 1977, Menachem Begin and the Likud party came to power in Israel.  He was 
the first Revisionist Zionist prime minister.  Immediately, he began a trend that would define the 
major leaders of the right to the present day.  That formula involved blustering calls for peace 
with the neighboring Arab states that would keep the international community focused on one 
hand while the other continues the subjugation of the Palestinian people.  In this way, the Likud 
has kept fairly consistent with the Labor party’s foreign policy, but with quite different ends in 
mind.  Begin utilized the Mizrachim’s lower class status as a way to make big promises that 
would elevate them, specifically above the Israeli Arabs, and their votes ushered in an era of 
Revisionist political control that aimed at the solidification of the Jewish state for Jews only.  
That Jewish state, in the post-Six Day War era, has been meant to include all of Judea and 
Samaria, more commonly known as the West Bank, as well as the Golan Heights.  The takeover 
of the Likud has been described as “the victory of irrational, primordial, anti-democratic 
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nationalism over the modern, universalist, democratic ethos of the [Labor party].”350  Begin’s 
successors, Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu specifically, have carried the Iron Wall 
Doctrine to the end of one century and into another.  The hidden hand of the Likud would 
continue the settlement doctrine that the Labor had all but abandoned by the late 1970s, invade 
Lebanon to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and aim policies toward a 
maximalist definition of the land of Israel ever since.  
 One Begin biographer, Eric Silver, described his muse as “a complex, but not mysterious, 
man.”351  He continued, “a paradox but not a puzzle: an unrepentant terrorist who won the Nobel 
Peace Prize, then launched another war…, Polish gentlemen and Levantine cult hero.  A man of 
honor with whom it was wise to read the small print.”352  This was the man that, after years of 
acquiescence to Labor control of Israel, sprang forth as the man that would lead the Zionist right 
to prominence and thus shape Israel’s future, geographically and politically.  Silver also 
explained that his “overriding priority was to secure the whole of the ancient homeland west of 
the Jordan for the Jewish people.”353  This is where Menachem Begin’s changing of the status 
quo becomes important.  
 Within his first term in office, Begin became a key figure in what would earn him 
international fame as well as a Nobel Prize for Peace.  He and Egyptian president Anwar al-
Sadat corresponded and met, along with advisors and US diplomats mediated by President 
Jimmy Carter, to construct the Camp David Accords in the fall of 1978.  These accords were 
intended to not only be a peace between the two nations, but a settlement of the situation that the 
Palestinian people had endured for thirty years.  After some correspondence, Sadat wrote Begin, 
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lamenting that some “remain captives to concepts like that of David and Goliath instead of being 
inspired by the brotherhood of Ismail and Isaac,” using biblical references to look toward peace 
rather than assertions of bravado.354  Begin responded, “The Biblical reference you cite 
concerning the kinship and brotherhood between our peoples is very moving.  I share its 
sentiment.  May I say, however, that the comparison between David and Goliath does not apply 
in our time.”355  Rhetoric was everything, but Begin was correct.  The Likud’s comparisons, of 
Israel as David surrounded by hostile Arab nations, has not been realistic since before the 
independence of the state.  Sadat’s concern expressed to Begin was the issue of the Palestinians 
themselves, the more comparable David figure.  He told Begin that “Coexistence with your Arab 
neighbors starts with coexistence with the Palestinian people.”356  This may have been 
overstating the facts as they existed.  The neighboring Arab states have consistently used the 
plight of the Palestinians, especially the refugees, as a political tool to who they themselves have 
been reluctant to provide aid.  What Sadat said next, however, proved to be true a decade later, in 
the Intifada from 1987 to 1993.  He predicted: 
If the Palestinians are left with the impression that the self-government plan, and not the 
administrative autonomy as you call it, is a sham, they will remain embittered and the 
voice of reason will be drowned among them.  As you well know, peoples never abandon 
their cause in the face of neglect or force.  You might recall your predecessor Ben-Gurion 
once said: ‘forgive…but never forget.’  This admonition applies to the Palestinians too.357 
 
Sadat appealed to Begin’s own past as a freedom fighter that shrugged off the perceived 
oppression of the British Mandate so many years earlier.  The contradiction of Begin’s, as well 
as his Revisionist successors’, understanding of Palestinian resistance is important to note here.  
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 The demonization of the Palestinian people as terrorists has been a part of the Revisionist 
leaders’ rhetoric since the Likud took power and has blatantly ignored the truths about those 
same Revisionists’ heritage.  Noted scholar Rashid Khalidi points out this irony in his book 
Brokers of Deceit.  The use of the word “terrorism,” according to Khalidi, “makes no distinction 
between violence directed against innocent civilians…and resistance against the armed forces of 
an illegal occupation, which is allowed” under international law.358  The ambiguity of that 
distinction, or lack thereof, can be understandable in the context of fighting against the British.  
There is no ambiguity when one remembers the actions at Deir Yassin.  Begin and Shamir share 
the title of terrorist in no uncertain terms for their actions in 1948.  
 Moving beyond the ambiguity of terrorism, the doctrine that these men clung to through 
their actions and rhetoric in the political arena has left far less to question.  Indeed the Likud 
party platform in 1977 stated: 
The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and indisputable and is 
linked with the right to security and peace.  Therefore, Judea and Samaria will not be 
handed over to any foreign administration.  Between the sea and the Jordan River there 
will be only Israeli sovereignty.  Relinquishing parts of the [West Bank] undermines our 
right to the country, unavoidably leads to the establishment of a “Palestinian state,” 
jeopardizes the security of the Jewish population, endangers the security of the State of 
Israel and frustrates any prospect of peace.359 
 
This is the opposite of the sentiment that Sadat expressed in his letter to Begin a year later.  The 
Revisionists have consistently spoken of concessions to the Palestinians as detrimental to Israel’s 
security, when those concessions could very well have been their best tool toward building 
peace.  As the Camp David Accords, and subsequent peace attempts such as the Madrid 
Conference and Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, have shown, rhetorical peace on the part of 
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Israel resists concessions, and once agreed upon, is still never fully implemented.  The iron wall 
must always be in place, and the perpetual war will continue on with Israeli dominance.  
 One of the reasons that peace between Israel and the Palestinians, at least those living in 
the West Bank and Gaza, is so hampered is because of the continuance of settler colonialism that 
expanded with the control of the Revisionists.  Begin, having served as prime minister from 1977 
to 1983, oversaw the largest expansion of Zionist settlements.  In May 1977, he “promised 
‘many more Eilon Morehs,’” referring to one such settlement .360  At the time, there were twenty-
three.   By the time he left office, the West Bank included over one hundred settlements.  The 
population of Jews living in the Occupied Territories increased from 3,000 to 40,000 in 
approximately that same span of only six years.361  This new expansion made it impossible, and 
in fact continues to do so, to delineate where Israel ends and the Palestinian territories or future 
state may exist.  Many of these settlements particularly early on were inhabited by force, by 
settlers who believed the whole of historic Palestine to be their birth right.  One such group was 
Gush Emunim.   
 Grown out of the Revisionist movement and harboring no regard for the native Arabs of 
the land, Gush Emunim, or Bloc of the Faithful, pushed Israeli boundaries far into the West 
Bank, establishing settlements closer to Arab villages than ever before.  The group was founded 
in 1974, by Israelis who, as Shamir referred to them, “believed, [as he did], that Judea and 
Samaria are an integral part of the Land of Israel, neither ‘captured’ in 1967 nor ‘returnable’ to 
anyone.”362  This has been the established belief of the Revisionist maximalists all along.  There 
has never been a right of the Palestinians to the land as long as the Zionist cause has a chance to 
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see their ends come to fruition.  These groups, and even the Israeli leadership, have often used 
biblical justifications for such actions.  Historian Michael Prior, in his essay “The Right to Expel: 
The Bible and Ethnic Cleansing,” exerts that biblical justifications are not uncommon in the 
history of imperialism or colonialism.  Referring to Joseph Conrad, he says “’the conquest of the 
earth is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much,’ colonizers invariably seek out some 
ideological principle to justify their actions, and when these involve dubious deeds of 
exploitation, the search is all the more intense.”363  He continued that “for Ben-Gurion, the Bible 
is the ‘Jews’ sacrosanct title-deed to Palestine…with a genealogy of 3,500 years.’”364  That 
concept has also been used by the Revisionists, and they have continued the tradition of wielding 
the Holy Scripture when most convenient.  This all to expand the power of the Israeli state, the 
Jewish state that turns an apathetic eye away from their Arab neighbors, their former fellow 
residents, and the population that remains within their borders.  
 In 1983, after a spell of ill health and a growing distaste for the politics that had once run 
his life, Menachem Begin made a decision that passed the torch of leadership to the next 
Revisionist and fellow 1948 terrorist, Yitzhak Shamir.  Begin called on Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon and at that time Foreign Minister Shamir to Jerusalem for a meeting.  These two were 
Herut colleagues and friends of Begin that became the first to know that he was planning on 
retirement within his term.  There occurred a meeting to discuss what would happen next for the 
future of the Likud and Shamir was announced as the heir apparent.  Shamir took office as prime 
minister for a party that he referred to as feeling “fatherless” after Begin’s resignation.365 
                                                          
363 Michael Prior, “The Right to Expel: The Bible and Ethnic Cleansing,” in Palestinian 
Refugees: The Right of Return, edited by Naseer Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 9. 
364 Ibid.  
365 Shamir, Summing Up, 144. 
115 
 
 Shamir acted as prime minister for two terms, separated by a brief term of Labor 
dominance, during the 1980s while overseeing the expansion of settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza and the first Palestinian Intifada.  In fact, there was a significant increase after 
Shamir’s ascendance to office that eclipsed what Begin’s administration had cultivated.  Not 
including two years when Shimon Peres was prime minister between Shamir’s terms in office, he 
oversaw the expansion of the settler population in the West Bank to over 110,000 by 1993.  To 
put that in perspective, the Jewish population in the West Bank in 1972 was 800, Begin saw that 
number increase to over 40,000, and Shamir allowed it to more than double.  This is not to say 
that the prime minister of Israel is solely responsible for settlement expansion, but the policies 
and rhetoric of these men have made it quite clear that they were not only encouraged but given 
the necessary means to flourish.  This massive influx of Zionist Jews into the Occupied 
Territories was clearly not without its complications, however.  The resulting Intifada in the late 
1980s showed how much the Palestinians were willing to resist Israeli occupation and 
subjugation, while at the same time the settlers themselves were less than peaceful.  In a 
particular piece of irony, the violent actions of settlers, of which there is a long history that there 
is not enough time here to discuss, were denounced outright by Shamir.  This was not for their 
behavior per se.  His statement on the matter of settler violence shows how ingrained the concept 
of being an old freedom fighter remained with him.  He said, in regard to the media drawing a 
comparison to his previous Lehi exploits: 
I found the suggestion as grotesque as it was insulting to the memory of an underground 
that had fought so nobly to establish the Jewish state.  Now that state existed.  It was 
almost inconceivable and very painful to me that, after thirty-six years of independence, 
there could be Jews in our midst who dared to deny its authority and refused to 
acknowledge the fundamental principle that the Government, and only the Government, 
was responsible for Israel’s security – and that of its citizens.366 
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Shamir’s response is indicative of his apparent contradictory view of his own actions from those 
who sought to carry out the Zionist maximalist agenda on the ground, for two reasons.  First, he 
did not see their actions as being in service of the Israeli state, which was ultimately the Zionist 
cause, as it had always been envisioned by him and the Revisionists.  Secondly, there is an irony 
in the fact that he had come to see the government as solely responsible for the security of the 
Zionist dream, while his earlier actions were in direct contradiction to the Provisional 
Government’s public policy.  Shamir kept up the tradition of Iron Wall Revisionism in every 
aspect.  
 After Shamir, the 1990s and 2000s saw a short resurgence in Labor Party dominance 
until the last Revisionist prime minister took the office from 1996 to 1999 and then again from 
2009 until the present, and currently holds the title as the longest serving premier, surpassing 
David Ben-Gurion.  Benjamin Netanyahu was born shortly after the war for independence and 
served in the IDF after the Six Day War in 1967.  From that time on, he has been an ardent 
patriot and Revisionist follower.  His views concerning the Palestinian refugee problem and the 
expansion of settlements into the West Bank has been in line with those of his predecessors.  In 
1993, he wrote a book entitled A Place Among the Nations, in which he discussed Israel’s place 
in the world as well as the Palestinian conflict.  He referred to the PLO as a war mongering 
organization that sought only to destroy Israel.  He feared a war launched from the West Bank if 
the Palestinians were given autonomy and the repatriation of displaced peoples within Israel 
were congruent with the destruction of the Jewish state.  
But the land war launched from a future West Bank state is not the only poisoned arrow 
being prepared for the PLO’s quiver.  The PLO has also maintained at the top of its list of 
demands…the ‘right of return…’  Teaching this futile dream to the generations of 
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children who are trapped in the refugee camps is one of the cruelest and most cynical of 
schemes.367 
 
Of special note is the language he used.  ‘Poisoned arrow’ vilifies the PLO while making 
altruistic statements that attempt to sound like he is concerned with the plight of the refugees, 
while at the same time refusing to accept the right of return.  In fact he believed that it was Israel, 
and not the Arab states, that had provided the most for the refugees.  His reference to the 
“Trinity,” West Bank statehood, self-determination, and the right of return, is what he believed to 
be the PLO’s conspiracy to destroy Israel.  Any one of these occurring would be enough, he said, 
to “amputate” Israel.368  If that was not enough, the right of return would suffocate them, thus 
finishing them off.  These were the apocalyptic views perpetuating the David versus Goliath 
analogy that Revisionists have used in public discourse.  True or not, his views are transparent.  
In spending countless shekels to aid the refugee crisis, Netanyahu said that “if the refugees have 
apartment buildings in which to live, this means that they are no longer homeless, no longer 
refugees, and no longer the embittered people the PLO prefers them to be.”369  Again, he sounds 
altruistic, and he did have a point about the Arab neighboring states and the PLO in that they 
benefitted from a continued refugee crisis in their political rhetoric against Israel.  But this does 
not excuse the actions of the Revisionist Zionist cause that has deepened the rift that keeps the 
problem unfixable.   
 Even an aide to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, quoted by Netanyahu, shows the Arab 
states’ refusal of refugee assistance to be true.  He explained that “the problem requiring solution 
is not the immigration of the world’s Jews to Palestine, but how to return refugees to 
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Palestine…The Arab states will not be willing to settle the [refugees]…Every refugee…must be 
allowed to return to Palestine.”370  Netanyahu pointed out how “Arabs often ask Westerners, how 
can it be that an Arab born in Jaffa cannot return there, while a Jew from Odessa who has never 
before set foot in Israel is welcomed with open arms?”371  The Revisionist in him allows him 
only to see this question as a problem to solving the crisis, shifting blame to the Arab states for 
the continuance of the plight of refugees.  The question itself is a valid one.  Thanks to the 
actions of the Zionist military forces, aided greatly by the Revisionist paramilitaries, the Labor 
Party’s solidification of the Jewish state, and the expansion of Iron Wall policies of the 
Revisionist leadership, the refugee crisis continues; surrounding Arab states may be complicit, 
but they are not the cause.   
 Apparent in the way Netanyahu views the right of return is the Revisionist dogma of 
Zionist maximalism.  He viewed, and according to contemporary rhetoric continues to, the right 
of return as “intended to mimic, counteract, and annul the Jewish dream of return by means of a 
false symmetry.  The Jews have returned, and now the Palestinian Arabs must return.”  This 
mimesis, as he puts it, compares the Jews who were “expelled in roughly equal numbers from the 
Arab states [in 1948]” while the Arabs that left Palestine “left voluntarily.”  Not only is this not 
accurate, as has been shown, neither is his statement that their voluntary exodus was caused by 
the “Arab leaders to ‘clear the way’ for the Arab armies.”  He went on to say that taking in the 
Palestinian refugees on top of those Jews of 1948 would be “preposterously unjust,” considering 
a “reversing” of population exchanges impossible and absent from previous historical population 
exchange events.372  His impossibly fascist ideology is evidence of the formation of Revisionist 
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Zionist identity in the years that crystallized a Jewish population as the sole owners of the Jewish 
state and into the Revisionist dominated contemporary.   
 Finally, in a world in which the attacks of September 11 have brought Islamic terrorism 
to the forefront of fears in the West, Netanyahu has used that fear to keep his rhetoric of security 
focused on Israel as David in the Middle East.  As tensions once again rise in the ongoing 
Palestine conflict, the Revisionist Iron Wall Doctrine is as potent as ever, with settlements 
expanding into the West Bank regardless of international opinion or law.  From Jabotinsky’s 
prophetic insight into the resistance of the Palestinian Arabs came the resistance of the Jews 
against British imperialism.  Once that conflict was won, the concept has continued to ring true 
in that the Palestinians have resisted in two Intifadas and by this writing what appears to be a 
third, always following peace talks that leave resolutions for agreement in the realm of rhetorical 
gestures.  This is the Iron Wall.  This is perpetual war.  Count Bernadotte fought for a solution to 
the refugee crisis in its infancy.  With his championing of humanitarian values buried well in the 
past, Revisionist policies have continued the legacy of the Iron Wall Doctrine.   
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CHAPTER 13:  CONCLUSION 
This research is an analysis of how Zionism, an agreeably positive concept at its original 
core, became radical, violent, and contradictorily subjugating of a people innocent to the 
thousands of years long Jewish plight.  From an idea to a political movement, from a treatise of 
self-determination to a virulent call to action, Zionism evolved into a political doctrine that at 
first played a part in creating a problem, and then continued to perpetuate the cycle from a 
position of power.  How that power came to be and how that doctrine came to rule, through an 
examination of not only the structures, but of the agents that shaped the historical structures now 
commonplace, is important to understanding modern realities.  This study argues that the 
figurative Iron Wall presented by the Revisionist founder evolved into a political doctrine that, 
owed largely to the assassination of the UN Mediator, has persisted in suppressing the 
Palestinian people in a perpetual state of war. 
The people responsible for the assassination of the UN Mediator fought for the freedom 
of their country.  Their fight was based on ideologies outside of the recognized Zionist 
leadership, though their actions worked hand in hand with the more mainstream Zionist policies 
to create the state of Israel.  Their disdain for foreign intervention and the proposals of 
Bernadotte fueled their actions.  Nathan Friedman-Yellin argued that “all fighters for justice are 
morally innocent.”373  According to him, Bernadotte was considered “to blame for the starvation 
and shelling of Jerusalem, and he regretted the death of every child in Jerusalem more than he 
regretted Bernadotte’s death.”374  The long history of Revisionist Zionism, especially its adoption 
of a violent anticolonial orientation, led to the assassination that disrupted international 
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intervention.  From colonizers to freedom fighters, the radical Zionists’ transformation through 
history by 1948 into nationalist terrorists was perhaps inevitable given the situations they 
encountered.  That evolution was built on a continuity of action.   
In his autobiography, Yitzhak Shamir explained that the legacy built by Jabotinsky was 
absolutely crucial in their endeavors: 
Though he never achieved leadership of the official Zionist establishment, knowing only 
the dubious joys of heading a perpetual minority, and although he died in 1940, before 
the birth of Israel, his contributions to it and his impact upon it are, in my view, no less 
than fundamental to its existence.375 
 
Not everyone felt the same way about the Revisionist founder.  David Ben-Gurion, for example, 
did not put as much stock into Jabotinsky’s role in the formation of the state.  When Jabotinsky 
passed away 4 August 1940, a work stoppage was ordered and the sixth of that month was 
declared a day of public mourning.  His son, imprisoned for illegal immigration activities, was 
released.  Black flags were donned on the streets of Jewish communities all over Palestine.376  
Zionists, of all political orientations, knew who and what they had lost.  His last will and 
testament, however, remained unanswered by the Zionist that would become the first Prime 
Minister of Israel.   
Jabotinsky’s final wish was to have his body buried in the Jewish state, should one come 
to exist, but only on the stipulation that it be commanded by the established government.  This is 
a request that Ben-Gurion refused to honor throughout his three terms as premier of that state.  
According to a biographer, Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion “offered varying pretexts for his 
opposition” to this request but in a letter written in 1956, almost ten years after the formation of 
the state, “he explained that there were two Jews worthy of being re-interred in Israel: Dr. Herzl 
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and Baron Edmond de Rothschild.”377  The former had written the Zionist manifesto, Der 
Judenstaat (The Jewish State), setting out the Zionist cause at the end of the nineteenth century 
while the latter’s financial contributions in the 1920s and 1930s assisted greatly in the settlement 
of Palestine.  With the exception of these two revered Zionists, Ben-Gurion felt that Israel “needs 
living Jews, and not the bones of the dead.”378  It was not until the next Prime Minister, Levi 
Eshkol, that Jabotinsky would find his final resting place atop Mount Herzl in Jerusalem.  His 
memory, regardless of his location, remained in Israel before and after.   
The Revisionists’ freedom fighter mentality is also apparent in the many names given to 
the independence war itself.  Though the Arab world refers to it as the 1948 War or al-nakba by 
the Palestinians, the Jews of the war refer to it as the War of Independence, the War of 
Liberation, and the War of Establishment.379  Shamir recalled that he often thought of how future 
generations of Jews would judge their actions.  He thought extensively on “the turn Jewish 
history had taken, the meaning of the crises through which we were living, … and how we and 
our struggle would appear, if at all, to the Jews of the next millennia.”  He wondered if “issues 
and occurrences of such importance to us be reduced, in decades to come, to a line or two in 
history books or, at best, form a paragraph in the total story of the Jews of the twentieth 
century?”380  The story of the Jews that fought for independence in 1948 has most certainly not 
been reduced to a historical footnote and their actions have carried on.  Wars are not static 
moments in history.  The long processes that developed to create this very unique set of 
circumstances and led to an act of aggression that benefitted a radical ideology will continue to 
live in the history of the Israeli people.  
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The legacy of Revisionist Zionism left after the war is manifested in the strife of the 
Palestinian refugees that continue to live without a home and the Iron Wall Doctrine that 
perpetuates that crisis.  As the early Zionists yearned for the “land without a people for a people 
without a land,” they displaced populations that are now a nation without a land of their own.  
Though the argument for and against the displacing of the Palestinians can be vilifying on both 
ends, the fact that it happened is less and less contested.  The processes to rectify the situation, 
however, have reached stymied opposition from the Revisionist leaders steeped in the Iron Wall 
Doctrine.  As professor Edward Said put it: 
The issue in the by now notorious peace process finally has come down to one issue, 
which has been at the core of Palestinian depredations since 1948: the fate of the refugees 
who were displaced in 1948, again in 1967 and again in 1982 by naked Israeli ethnic 
cleansing.  Any other description of those acts by the Israeli army is a travesty of the truth 
no matter how many protestations are heard from the unyielding Zionist right-wing 
(assuming that the left is more likely to accept the truth).381 
 
As can be seen, the language can become quite hostile when discussing such a sensitive subject, 
even for a world renowned scholar writing in a professional scholarly work.  But the facts 
support this sort of language.  Even Moshe Dayan, former Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as 
Defense for Israel, said that “there is not one place built in this country that did not have a former 
Arab population.”382  He could not even blame anyone for being ignorant to the original name of 
their hometown, for those names were no longer in the textbooks, erased from history, when he 
spoke on this to the Israeli publication Ha’aretz in 1969.   
 The war of words and practical Revisionist policy continues to the present, while 
relatively recent scholarship, since the 1980s, has begun to attempt an understanding of the 
process that led to the state of Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem.  This study is important 
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in not only understanding a fascinating period of historical study, but in understanding the past of 
a present international concern.  From students of the Middle East to policy makers in foreign 
affairs, from intrigued scholars to those in position to affect change in the world, new 
understandings must be reached to contextualize an ongoing epoch.   
This journey has been taken to understand how Zionism, from the turn of the twentieth 
century, allowed a breakaway that came in the form of Revisionism and how that turned into the 
modern state of Israel.  Examined are the birth of the Revisionist movement and Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky’s importance to it and its future, the radical evolution of Zionist causes in the face of 
imperialism, the culmination of that evolution to political violence and the death of Folke 
Bernadotte, and how that opened the door to allow a political doctrine of subjugation to flourish 
up to the twenty first century.  These processes compounded upon one another, and working 
backwards through history, it is clear that both Jabotinsky and Count Bernadotte were crucial to 
the current Iron Wall.  
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